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The priority of intentional action: From developmental to conceptual priority Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2024-05-11 Yair Levy
Philosophical orthodoxy has it that intentional action consists in one's intention appropriately causing a motion of one's body, placing the latter (conceptually and/or metaphysically) prior to the former. Here, I argue that this standard schema should be reversed: acting intentionally is at least conceptually prior to intending. The argument is modelled on a Williamsonian argument for the priority
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An unjustly neglected theory of semantic reference Philosophical Studies Pub Date : 2024-05-10 J. P. Smit
There is a simple, intuitive theory of the semantic reference of proper names that has been unjustly neglected. This is the view that semantic reference is conventionalized speakers reference, i.e. the view that a name semantically refers to an object if, and only if, there exists a convention to use the name to speaker-refer to that object. The theory can be found in works dealing primarily with other
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Safety’s coordination problems Philosophical Studies Pub Date : 2024-05-10 Julien Dutant, Sven Rosenkranz
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Incommensurability and healthcare priority setting Philosophical Studies Pub Date : 2024-05-10 Anders Herlitz
This paper argues that accepting incommensurability can be a useful step for developing attractive hybrid theories to how to distribute scarce health-related resources. If one provides opportunity for distributive options to be incommensurable with respect to substantive criteria, one can hold on to substantive criteria while also providing room for decision processes to play a significant role. The
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States’ culpability through time Philosophical Studies Pub Date : 2024-05-10 Stephanie Collins
Some contemporary states are morally culpable for historically distant wrongs. But which states for which wrongs? The answer is not obvious, due to secessions, unions, and the formation of new states in the time since the wrongs occurred. This paper develops a framework for answering the question. The argument begins by outlining a picture of states’ agency on which states’ culpability is distinct
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What is philosophical progress? Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2024-05-10 Finnur Dellsén, Tina Firing, Insa Lawler, James Norton
What is it for philosophy to make progress? While various putative forms of philosophical progress have been explored in some depth, this overarching question is rarely addressed explicitly, perhaps because it has been assumed to be intractable or unlikely to have a single, unified answer. In this paper, we aim to show that the question is tractable, that it does admit of a single, unified answer,
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The Varieties of Prudence Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-05-05 Simone Gubler
We sometimes face personal choices that are so momentous they appear to give rise to an intrapersonal analogue to the non-identity problem. Where the non-identity problem presents as a problem for ...
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Knowing what to do Noûs Pub Date : 2024-05-08 Ethan Jerzak, Alexander W. Kocurek
Much has been written on whether practical knowledge (knowledge‐how) reduces to propositional knowledge (knowledge‐that). Less attention has been paid to what we call deliberative knowledge (knowledge‐to), i.e., knowledge ascriptions embedding other infinitival questions, like where to meet, when to leave, and what to bring. We offer an analysis of knowledge‐to and argue on its basis that, regardless
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The having objection to bundle theories of subjects of experience Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2024-05-08 Donnchadh O'Conaill
The self or subject of experiences is often regarded as a mysterious entity, prompting approaches that seek to deflate it, metaphysically speaking. One such approach is the bundle theory, the most well-known version of which holds that each subject is a bundle of experiences. This version of the bundle theory seems vulnerable to the having objection: since subjects have experiences, they cannot be
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The case for a duty to use gender-fair language in democratic representation Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2024-05-06 Corrado Fumagalli, Martina Rosola
In the light of a study of the difference between political actors and ordinary citizens as language users, and based on three moral arguments (consequence-based, recognition-based, and complicity-based), we propose that democratic representatives have an imperfect duty to use gender-fair-language in their public communication.In the case of members of the executive, such as ministries, prime ministries
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The Golden Rule: A Defence Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-05-02 Daniel Rönnedal
According to the so-called golden rule, we ought to treat others as we want to be treated by them. This rule, in one form or another, is part of every major religion, and it has been accepted by ma...
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Why prevent human extinction? Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2024-05-02 James Fanciullo
Many of us think human extinction would be a very bad thing, and that we have moral reasons to prevent it. But there is disagreement over what would make extinction so bad, and thus over what grounds these moral reasons. Recently, several theorists have argued that our reasons to prevent extinction stem not just from the value of the welfare of future lives, but also from certain additional values
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Philosophy in Science: Can Philosophers of Science Permeate through Science and Produce Scientific Knowledge? Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2024-04-30 Thomas Pradeu, Maël Lemoine, Mahdi Khelfaoui, Yves Gingras
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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Front Matter Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2024-04-30
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Volume 75, Issue 1, March 2024.
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Platonism and intra-mathematical explanation Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2024-05-01 Sam Baron
I introduce an argument for Platonism based on intra-mathematical explanation: the explanation of one mathematical fact by another. The argument is important for two reasons. First, if the argument succeeds then it provides a basis for Platonism that does not proceed via standard indispensability considerations. Second, if the argument fails, it can only do so for one of the three reasons: either because
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Nietzsche and the Significance of Genealogy Mind Pub Date : 2024-05-01 Alexander Prescott-Couch
How is Nietzsche’s genealogy of morality relevant to his revaluation of values? I consider and reject three accounts: contingency accounts, pedigree accounts, and unmasking accounts. I then propose an alternative account. On this view, Nietzsche provides a ‘deconstructive genealogy’ that indicates whether and where we should expect to find unity in our current moral practices. Moreover, Nietzsche’s
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A defense of back‐end doxastic voluntarism Noûs Pub Date : 2024-04-30 Laura K. Soter
Doxastic involuntarism—the thesis that we lack direct voluntary control (in response to non‐evidential reasons) over our belief states—is often touted as philosophical orthodoxy. I here offer a novel defense of doxastic voluntarism, centered around three key moves. First, I point out that belief has two central functional roles, but that discussions of voluntarism have largely ignored questions of
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Indexicality, Bayesian background and self‐location in fine‐tuning arguments for the multiverse Noûs Pub Date : 2024-04-29 Quentin Ruyant
Our universe seems to be miraculously fine‐tuned for life. Multiverse theories have been proposed as an explanation for this on the basis of probabilistic arguments, but various authors have objected that we should consider our total evidence that this universe in particular has life in our inference, which would block the argument. The debate thus crucially hinges on how Bayesian background and evidence
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Expected choiceworthiness and fanaticism Philosophical Studies Pub Date : 2024-04-29 Calvin Baker
Maximize Expected Choiceworthiness (MEC) is a theory of decision-making under moral uncertainty. It says that we ought to handle moral uncertainty in the way that Expected Value Theory (EVT) handles descriptive uncertainty. MEC inherits from EVT the problem of fanaticism. Roughly, a decision theory is fanatical when it requires our decision-making to be dominated by low-probability, high-payoff options
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Logicality in natural language Philosophical Studies Pub Date : 2024-04-29 Gil Sagi
Is there a relation of logical consequence in natural language? Logicality, in the philosophical literature, has been conceived of as a restrictive phenomenon that is at odds with the unbridled richness and complexity of natural language. This article claims that there is a relation of logical consequence in natural language, and moreover, that it is the subject matter of the bulk of current theories
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Normativity, prudence and welfare Philosophical Studies Pub Date : 2024-04-29 Michael Ridge
Most discussions of discourse about welfare and discourse about prudence are a “package deal” when it comes to their normativity—either both or neither are normative. In this paper I argue against this conventional “package deal” assumption. I argue that discourse about welfare is not normative in one useful sense of that term, but that prudential discourse is normative. My argument draws in part on
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Methodological worries for humean arguments from evil Philosophical Studies Pub Date : 2024-04-29 Timothy Perrine
Humean arguments from evil are some of the most powerful arguments against Theism. They take as their data what we know about good and evil. And they argue that some rival to Theism better explains, or otherwise predicts, that data than Theism. However, this paper argues that there are many problems with various methods for defending Humean arguments. I consider Philo’s original strategy; modern strategies
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In defense of genuine un-forgiving Philosophical Studies Pub Date : 2024-04-29 Anna-Bella Sicilia
Despite much philosophical attention on forgiveness itself, the phenomenon of un-forgiving is relatively neglected. Some views of forgiveness commit us to denying that we can ever permissibly un-forgive. Some go so far as to say the concept of un-forgiving is incomprehensible—it is the nature of forgiveness to be permanent. Yet many apparent cases of un-forgiving strike us as both real and justified
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Symmetries and ground Philosophical Studies Pub Date : 2024-04-29 Martin Glazier
If the tiles of a mosaic are arranged symmetrically, then the image those tiles constitute must be symmetric as well. This paper formulates and defends the general principle at work in this case: roughly, that a symmetry cannot ground an asymmetry. It is argued that the principle supports strong objections to four metaphysical views: qualitativism, relationalism, the tenseless or ‘B’ theory of time
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The presumption of realism Philosophical Studies Pub Date : 2024-04-29 Nils Franzén
Within contemporary metaethics, it is widely held that there is a “presumption of realism” in moral thought and discourse. Anti-realist views, like error theory and expressivism, may have certain theoretical considerations speaking in their favor, but our pretheoretical stance with respect to morality clearly favors objectivist metaethical views. This article argues against this widely held view. It
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The good life as the life in touch with the good Philosophical Studies Pub Date : 2024-04-29 Adam Lovett, Stefan Riedener
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Does matter mind content? Noûs Pub Date : 2024-04-27 Verónica Gómez Sánchez
Let ‘semantic relevance’ be the thesis that the wide semantic properties of representational mental states (like beliefs and desires) are causally relevant to behavior. A popular way of arguing for semantic relevance runs as follows: start with a sufficient counterfactual condition for causal or explanatory relevance, and show that wide semantic properties meet it with respect to behavior (e.g., Loewer
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Internalizing rules Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2024-04-27 Spencer Paulson
The aim of this paper is to give an account of what it is to internalize a rule. I claim that internalization is the process of redistributing the burden of instruction from the teacher to the student. The process is complete when instruction is no longer needed, and the rule has reshaped perceptual classification of the circumstances in which it applies. Teaching a rule is the initiation of this process
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The epistemology of interpersonal relations Noûs Pub Date : 2024-04-27 Matthew A. Benton
What is it to know someone? Epistemologists rarely take up this question, though recent developments make such inquiry possible and desirable. This paper advances an account of how such interpersonal knowledge goes beyond mere propositional and qualitative knowledge about someone, giving a central place to second‐personal treatment. It examines what such knowledge requires, and what makes it distinctive
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The self-reinforcing nature of joint action Philosophical Studies Pub Date : 2024-04-27 Facundo M. Alonso
Shared intention normally leads to joint action. It does this, it is commonly said, only because it is a characteristically stable phenomenon, a phenomenon that tends to persist from the time it is formed until the time it is fulfilled. However, the issue of what the stability of shared intention comes down to remains largely undertheorized. My aim in this paper is to remedy this shortcoming. I argue
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Existentialist risk and value misalignment Philosophical Studies Pub Date : 2024-04-25 Ariela Tubert, Justin Tiehen
We argue that two long-term goals of AI research stand in tension with one another. The first involves creating AI that is safe, where this is understood as solving the problem of value alignment. The second involves creating artificial general intelligence, meaning AI that operates at or beyond human capacity across all or many intellectual domains. Our argument focuses on the human capacity to make
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Fictions that don’t tell the truth Philosophical Studies Pub Date : 2024-04-25 Neri Marsili
Can fictions lie? According to a classic conception, works of fiction can never contain lies, since their content is not presented as true, nor is it meant to deceive us. But this classic view can be challenged. Sometimes fictions appear to make claims about the actual world, and these claims can be designed to convey falsehoods, historical misconceptions, and even pernicious stereotypes. Should we
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Evidentialism, justification, and knowledge‐first Noûs Pub Date : 2024-04-24 Alexander Bird
This paper examines the relationship between evidentialism, knowledge‐first epistemology, (E=K) in particular, and justification. Evidentialism gives an account of justified belief in terms of evidence but is silent on the nature of evidence. Knowledge‐first tells us what evidence is but stands in need of an agreed account of justification. So each might be able to supply what the other lacks. I argue
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Why there are no Frankfurt‐style omission cases Noûs Pub Date : 2024-04-24 Joseph Metz
Frankfurt‐style action cases have been immensely influential in the free will and moral responsibility literatures because they arguably show that an agent can be morally responsible for a behavior despite lacking the ability to do otherwise. However, even among the philosophers who accept Frankfurt‐style action cases, there remains significant disagreement about whether also to accept Frankfurt‐style
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Consensual discrimination Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2024-04-24 Andreas Bengtson, Lauritz Aastrup Munch
What makes discrimination morally bad? In this paper, we discuss the putative badness of a case of consensual discrimination to show that prominent accounts of the badness of discrimination—appealing, inter alia, to harm, disrespect, and inequality—fail to provide a satisfactory answer to this question. In view of this, we present a more promising account.
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The normative property dualism argument Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2024-04-24 Jesse Hambly
In this paper, I develop an argument against a type of Non-Analytic Normative Naturalism. This argument, the Normative Property Dualism Argument, suggests that if Non-Analytic Normative Naturalists posit that normative properties are identical to natural properties and that such identities are a posteriori, they will be forced to posit that these properties that are both normative and natural have
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Linguistic imposters Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2024-04-22 Denis Kazankov, Edison Yi
There is a widespread phenomenon that we call linguistic imposters. Linguistic imposters are systematic misuses of expressions that misusers mistake with their conventional usages because of misunderstanding their meaning. Our paper aims to provide an initial framework for theorising about linguistic imposters that will lay the foundation for future philosophical research about them. We focus on the
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The Unity of Science and the Mentaculus Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2024-04-19 Martin Glazier
Among the most promising options for vindicating Oppenheim and Putnam’s unity of science hypothesis is the ‘Mentaculus’ of Albert and Loewer. I assess whether this promise can be borne out. My focus is on whether the Mentaculus can deliver what Oppenheim and Putnam call the ‘unity of laws’: the reduction of special science laws to the laws of fundamental physics. I conclude that although the Mentaculus
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Mental Causation for Standard Dualists Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-04-18 Bram Vaassen
The standard objection to dualist theories of mind is that they seemingly cannot account for the obvious fact that mental phenomena cause our behaviour. On the plausible assumption that all our beh...
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Options and Agency Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-04-18 Sophie Kikkert, Barbara Vetter
Published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Ahead of Print, 2024)
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Marcus on self‐conscious knowledge of belief Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2024-04-18 James R. Shaw
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Marcus on forms of judgment and the theoretical orientation of the mind Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2024-04-18 Lucy Campbell
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Some challenges raised by unconscious belief Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2024-04-18 Adam Leite
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Precis of belief, inference, and the self‐conscious mind Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2024-04-18 Eric Marcus
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Judgment's aimless heart Noûs Pub Date : 2024-04-16 Matthew Vermaire
It's often thought that when we reason to new judgments in inference, we aim at believing the truth, and that this aim of ours can explain important psychological and normative features of belief. I reject this picture: the structure of aimed activity shows that inference is not guided by a truth‐aim. This finding clears the way for a positive understanding of how epistemic goods feature in our doxastic
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Metanormative regress: an escape plan Philosophical Studies Pub Date : 2024-04-15 Christian Tarsney
How should you decide what to do when you’re uncertain about basic normative principles? A natural suggestion is to follow some “second-order” norm: e.g., obey the most probable norm or maximize expected choiceworthiness. But what if you’re uncertain about second-order norms too—must you then invoke some third-order norm? If so, any norm-guided response to normative uncertainty appears doomed to a
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What Justifies Electoral Voice? J. S. Mill on Voting Mind Pub Date : 2024-04-12 Jonathan Turner
Mill advocates plural voting on instrumentalist grounds: the more competent are to have more votes. At the same time, he regards it as a ‘personal injustice’ to withhold from anyone ‘the ordinary privilege of having his voice reckoned in the disposal of affairs in which he has the same interest as other people’ (Mill 1861a, p. 469). But if electoral voice is justified by its contribution to good governance
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Two approaches to metaphysical explanation Noûs Pub Date : 2024-04-10 Ezra Rubenstein
Explanatory metaphysics aspires to explain the less fundamental in terms of the more fundamental. But we should recognize two importantly different approaches to this task. According to the generation approach, more basic features of reality generate (or give rise to) less basic features. According to the reduction approach, less perspicuous ways of representing reality reduce to (or collapse into)
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People and places Noûs Pub Date : 2024-04-10 John Horden, Dan López de Sa
Several authors have argued that socially significant places such as countries, cities and establishments are immaterial objects, despite their being spatially located. In contrast, we aim to defend a reductive materialist view of such entities, which identifies them with their physical territories or premises. Accordingly, these are all material objects; typically, aggregates of land and infrastructure
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Indiscernibility and the grounds of identity Philosophical Studies Pub Date : 2024-04-10 Samuel Z. Elgin
I provide a theory of the metaphysical foundations of identity: an account of what grounds facts of the form \(a=b\). In particular, I defend the claim that indiscernibility grounds identity. This is typically rejected because it is viciously circular; plausible assumptions about the logic of ground entail that the fact that \(a=b\) partially grounds itself. The theory I defend is immune to this circularity
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What, If Anything, Is Biological Altruism? Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2024-04-08 Topaz Halperin, Arnon Levy
The study of biological altruism is a cornerstone of modern evolutionary biology. Associated with foundational issues about natural selection, it is often supposed that explaining altruism is key to understanding social behaviour more generally. Typically, ‘biological’ altruism is defined in purely effects-based, behavioural terms—as an interaction in which one organism contributes fitness to another
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Regions, extensions, distances, diameters Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2024-04-09 Claudio Calosi
Extended simple regions have been the focus of recent developments in philosophical logic, metaphysics, and philosophy of physics. However, only a handful of works provides a rigorous characterization of an extended simple region. In particular, a recent paper in this journal defends a definition based on an extrinsic notion of least distance. Call it the Least Distance proposal. This paper provides
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The irrational failure to act Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2024-04-09 Matthew Heeney
I defend against a salient objection the thesis that practical rationality requires us to perform intentional actions. The objection is that if rationality requires the performance of intentional actions, then agents are irrational for failing to succeed in what they intend to do. I reply to this objection by hewing closely to the principle that the rational ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. We are rationally
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Incommensurability and hardness Philosophical Studies Pub Date : 2024-04-09 Chrisoula Andreou
There is growing support for the view that there can be cases of incommensurability, understood as cases in which two alternatives, X and Y, are such that X is not better than Y, Y is not better than X, and X and Y are not equally good. This paper assumes that alternatives can be incommensurable and explores the prominent idea that, insofar as choice situations that agents face qua rational agents
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Introspection Is Signal Detection Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2024-04-05 Jorge Morales
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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