个人简介
2012-2017 新加坡国立大学经济学系 经济学博士
2007-2012 苏州大学-新加坡国立大学“3+2”联合培养 数学本科、硕士
研究成果发表于Journal of Public Economics, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Economic Inquiry, Economics Letters等经济学学术期刊。
Referee for: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Economic Inquiry, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Social Choice and Welfare.
科研奖励
2012-2016, 新加坡国立大学研究型奖学金
2016, Travel Support, 4th Summer School of the Econometric Society
科研项目
主持国家自然科学基金委青年项目(项目号71803019),“动态竞争下的最优创新激励机制:基于多场次竞赛模型”,2019-2021.
Work in Progress:
[1] Feng, Xin, Jingfeng Lu, and Lixin Ye, “Procurement Design with Optimal Sequential R&D.”
Conference/Seminar/Summer School Presentations:
2021: SYSU (scheduled)
2020: DUFE (virtual); Econometric Society World Congress (virtual)
2019: Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society; CUHK (Shenzhen); Shandong U
2018: China Meeting of the Econometric Society; 2018 International Conference on Economic Theory and Applications; NUS-IMS Workshop on Matching, Search and Market Design; Wuhan U
2017: Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society; China Meeting of the Econometric Society
2016: Western Economic Association International Conference; North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society; 4th Summer School of the Econometric Society; Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society
2015: SAET Conference on Current Trends in Economics; Singapore Economic Review Conference
研究领域
应用微观理论、信息经济学
竞赛理论、拍卖理论、信息设计
近期论文
查看导师新发文章
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[1] Lu, Jingfeng, Lixin Ye, and Xin Feng. “Orchestrating Information Acquisition.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, forthcoming.
[2] Feng, Xin. “Information Disclosure on the Contest Mechanism,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 91 (2020): 148–156.
[3] Feng, Xin, Jingfeng Lu, and Yeneng Sun. “Ex ante Efficient Mechanism with Private Entry,” Economic Inquiry, 58-3 (2020): 1531-1541.
[4] Feng, Xin and Jingfeng Lu. “How to Split the Pie: Optimal Rewards in Dynamic Multi-Battle Competitions,” Journal of Public Economics, 160 (2018): 82-95.
[5] Feng, Xin and Jingfeng Lu. “Uniqueness of equilibrium in two-player, asymmetric Tullock contests with intermediate discriminatory power,” Economics Letters, 159 (2017): 61-64.
[6] Feng, Xin and Jingfeng Lu. “The Optimal Disclosure Policy in Contests with Stochastic Entry: A Bayesian Persuasion Perspective,” Economics Letters, 147 (2016): 103-107.
会议与工作论文
[1] Feng, Xin. “Information Disclosure in All-pay Auctions with Costly Entry.” R&R at International Journal of Game Theory.
[2] X. Feng, Q. Jiao, Z. Kuang, and J. Lu. “Optimal Prize Design in Team Contests.” Submitted.
[3] Agastya, Mural, Xin Feng, and Jingfeng Lu. “Auction Design with Shortlisting When Value Discovery Is Covert.” Submitted.