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[1]郭慧.行政发包制下的我国PPP 模式演化机理研究[J],工程管理学报,2021,35(4):59-64
[2]沙凯逊.项目的逻辑[J],项目管理技术,2021,19(2):-7
[3]石磊.Double Moral Hazard and Risk-Sharing in Construction Projects[J],IEEE Transactions on Engineering Managemnt,2021,68(6):1919-1929
[4]顾坤,石磊.需求不足下交通PPP项目社会资本方退出机制[J],工程管理学报,2020,34(2):106-111
[5]章拓,石磊.基于社会资本方认知强度的PPP项目契约的不完全性研究[J],项目管理技术,2020,18(5):8-13
[6]Shi, Lei,Li, Weiwen,He, Yujia.An Incentive Analysis of Availability Payment Mechanism in PPP Projects[J],IEEE ACCESS,2020,8:106046-106058
[7]苑贺辉,石磊.PPP项目竞争性磋商采购效率分析[J],工程管理学报,2019,33(02):86-91
[8]石磊,何雨佳.PPP项目两阶段招标激励机制博弈分析[J],工程管理学报,2018,32(3):64-68
[9]钱瑞盈,石磊.基于交易成本理论的PPP项目再谈判影响因素分析[J],项目管理技术,2018,16(6):20-25
[10]何雨佳,石磊.基于关键成功要素的PPP项目政府角色定位研究[J],项目管理技术,2018,16(1):24-30
[11]Shi, Lei,He, Yujia,Onishi, Masamitsu,Kobayashi, Kiyoshi.Efficiency Analysis of Government Subsidy and Performance Guarantee Policies in Relation to PPP...[J],MATHEMATICAL PROBLEMS IN ENGINEERING,2018,2018
[12]Shi, Lei,Zhang, Lu,Onishi, Masamitsu,Kobayashi, Kiyoshi,Dai, Dashuang.Contractual Efficiency of PPP Infrastructure Projects: An Incomplete Contract Model[J],MATHEMATICAL PROBLEMS IN ENGINEERING,2018,2018
[13]何雨佳,邢畅,石磊.基于契约和信任的建设项目成本超支风险分担研究[J],项目管理技术,2017,15(11):29-34
[14]张禄,石磊,戴大双,马力.PPP项目政府担保对项目效率影响研究[J],中国管理科学,2017,25(8):89-102
[15]石磊,邢畅,戴大双.建设工程合同双边道德风险问题研究[J],工程管理学报,2017,31(1):123-128
[16]党建军,石磊.基于2013版施工合同的建设工程项目风险分担研究[J],建筑设计管理,2016,12:62-65
[17]石磊.The efficiency analysis of government guarantee in PPP Projects[A],2016
[18]石磊.The Structure of Governance for Construction Contract in China: Based on the Comparative Study wi...[J],Journal of Japan Society of Civil Engineers,2016,72(4):111-122
[19]石磊,刘安琪.三方代建模式下共同代理问题研究[J],工程管理学报,2015,2:91-95
[20]石磊.Payoff-externality and performance-based contract for transport infrastructure[J],International Journal of Transport,2015,3(1):37-54
[21]石磊,杜子超,王东波.环境风险中政府信息公开与民众参与的博弈研究[J],大连理工大学学报（社会科学版）,2014,35(4):93-100
[22]康大伟,石磊.工程项目合同纠纷协商解决机制研究——基于鲁宾斯坦讨价还价理论[J],项目管理技术,2014,12(10):77-81
[23]李玲,石磊.基于博弈论的建设工程项目承包商与监理合谋问题研究[J],价值工程,2014,16:9-11,12
[24]石磊,刘春城,张哲.自锚式悬索桥挠度理论基础微分方程近似推导[A],2014,121-123
[25]石磊.Government Disclosure of Environgment Risk Information: The Role of Citizen Participation[A],2014
[26]石磊,李玲.基于博弈论的建设工程项目承包商与监理合谋问题研究[A],2013,155-160
[27]石磊.Common Agency Problem in China Agent-Construction Projects[A],2013
[28]石磊.Buyout Option and Contract Efficiency in China’s BOT Projects[A],2013
[29]石磊.Bankruptcy Risk and Buyout in PPP Projects[A],2013
[30]Lei, Shi.Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Infrastructure Performance-Based Maintenance Contracts[A],2012,561-566
[31]石磊,孙晓丽.BOT项目风险转移的悖论——以日本-BOT失败项目为研究对象[J],管理案例研究与评论,2011,04(4):248-256
[32]石磊.Organization and Corruption in Construction Projects[A],2011,4223-4227
[33]Liu, Bao-Shan,Zhao, Guo-Zhong,Shi, Lei.Design optimization of acoustic radiation from structures under random excitation[J],NOISE CONTROL ENGINEERING JOURNAL,2010,58(2):132-144
[34]石磊.開発途上国建設プロジェクトにおける不正行為と抑止政策[J],Journal of Japan Society of Civil Engineers Infrastructure Planning,2010,27(1):137-146
[35]石磊.Risk allocation and double moral hazard in construction contract[A],2010
[36]石磊.建設契約におけるダブルモラルハザード[J],Journal of Japan Society of Civil Engineers,2010,66(4):414-430
[37]石磊.地方自治体の連携による地方公共財の供給問題[A],2010
[38]戴大双,石磊.BOT项目运营期内项目公司道德风险博弈分析[J],技术经济,2010,28(10):47-51
[39]石磊.Breach of Construction Contract and Contract Efficiency[A],2009
[40]石磊.Corruption and Contract Governance of Construction Project in Developing Countries[A],2009,167-174
[41]Dai, Dashuang,Shi, Lei,Huang, Wulin.Collusion and Contract Efficiency in BOT project[A],2008,7509-7513
[42]Shi, Lei,Huang, Winlin,Dai, Dashuang.Breach of Contract and Deposit in BOT Projects[A],2008,7745-7749
[43]Shi, Lei,Xiong, Songping,Dai, Dashuang.Ownership Structure and Contract Efficiency in BOT Projects[A],2008,7545-7548
[44]石磊,戴大双,王东波.利益外部性和BOT模式的有效性[J],中国管理科学,2008,16(4):120-126
[45]石磊.Payoff Externality and Contract Efficiency of BOT Projects[A],2008,53-61
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