Managing global marine resources by assigning property rights could align economic and conservation incentives, but only if unauthorized resource use is deterred. Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) are country-level property rights to marine resources, covering approximately 39% of the ocean’s surface and accounting for more than 95% of global marine fish catch. However, EEZs might not be respected by unauthorized resource users because the cost of monitoring and enforcing such large areas may be prohibitive. Here we provide the first evidence that EEZs are in fact respected by unauthorized resource users. Using global, high-resolution fishing effort datasets and the ecologically arbitrary boundaries between EEZs and the high seas, we find that unauthorized foreign fishing is 81% lower just inside EEZs compared to just outside. Consistent with the high cost of enforcing EEZ boundaries, this deterrence effect is concentrated in EEZs that are most valuable near their boundaries. Our results suggest that property rights institutions can enable effective governance of global marine resource use.

通过分配财产权来管理全球海洋资源可以使经济和保护激励措施保持一致，但前提是要阻止未经授权的资源使用。专属经济区（EEZ）是国家一级的海洋资源财产权，覆盖大约39％的海洋表层，占全球海洋鱼类捕捞量的95％以上。但是，未经授权的资源用户可能不会尊重EEZ，因为监视和执行如此大的区域的成本可能令人望而却步。在这里，我们提供了第一个证据，即未经授权的资源用户实际上尊重了专属经济区。使用全球高分辨率的捕捞努力数据集以及专属经济区和公海之间的生态任意边界，我们发现，在专属经济区内，未经许可的外国捕鱼活动比在外部地区低81％。与强制执行专属经济区边界的高昂费用相一致，这种威慑效应集中于在专属经济区附近最有价值的专属经济区。我们的结果表明，产权制度可以有效管理全球海洋资源的使用。