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Monetary policy at the periphery during the Classical Gold Standard: Italy (1894–1913)
Explorations in Economic History ( IF 2.6 ) Pub Date : 2025-04-01 , DOI: 10.1016/j.eeh.2025.101680
Paolo Di Martino , Fabio C. Bagliano
Explorations in Economic History ( IF 2.6 ) Pub Date : 2025-04-01 , DOI: 10.1016/j.eeh.2025.101680
Paolo Di Martino , Fabio C. Bagliano
This paper analyzes monetary policy in Italy between 1894 and WWI by focusing on the main bank of issue at the time (the Banca d’Italia , BdI) and the Treasury. We show that the Treasury set multiple official rates, and the BdI determined an ”effective” rate transmitted to the market by discounting different bills to the various rates; we provide an original measure of this rate based on primary sources. The BdI changed its rate in response to the domestic market rate (although with a milder reaction than the Treasury), the stock of money in circulation, and its reserve coverage ratio. Changes in the official discount rates in France and Germany also triggered relatively modest reactions. Neither the exchange rate nor the state of the domestic economy affected the setting of the rate. Until the turn of the century, the BdI only targeted corporate goals of profitability and financial soundness, while it also pursued policy aims afterward. In this context, the bank set the discount rate to accumulate reserves for market interventions.
中文翻译:
古典金本位制时期的外围货币政策:意大利 (1894–1913)
本文通过关注当时的主要发行银行(Banca d'Italia,BdI)和财政部,分析了 1894 年至第一次世界大战期间意大利的货币政策。我们表明,财政部设定了多个官方利率,而 BdI 通过将不同的票据贴现到不同的利率来确定传递给市场的“有效”利率;我们根据主要来源提供了此比率的原始度量值。BdI 根据国内市场汇率(尽管反应比财政部温和)、流通中的货币存量及其准备金覆盖率而改变其汇率。法国和德国官方贴现率的变化也引发了相对温和的反应。汇率和国内经济状况都不会影响汇率的设定。直到世纪之交,BdI 只针对盈利能力和财务稳健性的企业目标,同时也追求之后的政策目标。在这种情况下,银行设定贴现率以积累市场干预的准备金。
更新日期:2025-04-01
中文翻译:

古典金本位制时期的外围货币政策:意大利 (1894–1913)
本文通过关注当时的主要发行银行(Banca d'Italia,BdI)和财政部,分析了 1894 年至第一次世界大战期间意大利的货币政策。我们表明,财政部设定了多个官方利率,而 BdI 通过将不同的票据贴现到不同的利率来确定传递给市场的“有效”利率;我们根据主要来源提供了此比率的原始度量值。BdI 根据国内市场汇率(尽管反应比财政部温和)、流通中的货币存量及其准备金覆盖率而改变其汇率。法国和德国官方贴现率的变化也引发了相对温和的反应。汇率和国内经济状况都不会影响汇率的设定。直到世纪之交,BdI 只针对盈利能力和财务稳健性的企业目标,同时也追求之后的政策目标。在这种情况下,银行设定贴现率以积累市场干预的准备金。