We present a dynamic model of information acquisition and disclosure. The manager seeks to maximize future stock prices and collects information privately about the firm's fundamentals. Information acquisition increases the arrival rate of private information. The manager can choose to disclose his private information or withhold it in perpetuity. We study the impact of information acquisition on the accumulation of private information, disclosure, and the firm's initial investment.

中文翻译：

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动态信息获取、投资和披露


我们提出了一个信息获取和披露的动态模型。该经理寻求使未来股票价格最大化，并私下收集有关公司基本面的信息。信息获取提高了私人信息的到达率。经理可以选择披露他的私人信息或永久保留它。我们研究了信息获取对私人信息积累、披露和公司初始投资的影响。