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Regulating inattention in fee-based financial advice
Journal of Financial Economics ( IF 10.4 ) Pub Date : 2024-12-24 , DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103985
Roger M. Edelen, Kingsley Y.L. Fong, Jingyi Han

We study the impact of disclosure and inattention on the decision to retain fee-based financial advice using a two-tiered natural regulatory experiment. Increased salience in fee disclosure raises the drop rate for advice, implying improved attention — particularly for relatively sophisticated investors. However, a novel auto-drop requirement for inattentive investors generates far more drops, implying limited attention despite salient disclosure — particularly for the unsophisticated. Contrary to studies of commission-based advice, we find that investors benefit from fee-based advice. Benefits are higher for less sophisticated investors, who tend to be detrimentally auto-dropped. Drops triggered by salient disclosure tend to be beneficial.

中文翻译:


规范收费财务咨询中的疏忽



我们使用两级自然监管实验研究披露和疏忽对保留收费财务建议的决定的影响。费用披露的显著性提高,建议的放弃率更高,这意味着关注度提高——尤其是对于相对成熟的投资者。然而,对粗心投资者的新自动放弃要求会产生更多的下跌,这意味着尽管披露了显著的信息,但关注度有限——尤其是对于不成熟的投资者。与佣金制建议的研究相反,我们发现投资者从收费制建议中受益。不太成熟的投资者的好处更高,他们往往会被有害地自动放弃。由显著披露触发的下降往往是有益的。
更新日期:2024-12-24
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