This paper uses hand-collected historical data to provide empirical evidence on the strategic trading behavior of insiders and its consequences for outsiders. Specifically, we collect all equity trades of all insiders and outsiders in an era without legal restrictions on insider trading and a market where trading is non-anonymous. We find that access to private information creates a significant gap between the post-trade returns of insiders and outsiders. Consistent with theory, insiders capitalize on their information advantage by hiding their identity and timing their trades. Both experienced and inexperienced outsiders face expected losses due to this strategic insider trading.

中文翻译：

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战略性内幕交易及其对局外人的影响：18 世纪的证据


本文使用手工收集的历史数据来提供有关内部人士的战略交易行为及其对外部人士的影响的经验证据。具体来说，我们收集了在对内幕交易没有法律限制的时代和非匿名交易市场中所有内幕人士和外人的所有股权交易。我们发现，访问私人信息会在内部人和外部人士的交易后回报之间造成巨大差距。与理论一致，内部人士通过隐藏身份和安排交易时间来利用他们的信息优势。由于这种战略性的内幕交易，有经验和没有经验的局外人都面临着预期的损失。