This study examines whether the equity lending supply strengthens or weakens corporate risk-taking behaviors. The evidence shows that ex-ante short selling can unintentionally function as an external governance mechanism to discipline self-interested, risk-averse managers. This showed an increase in long-term risk-taking among U.S. firms from 2006 to 2017. The robustness of our findings is confirmed by the consistent results obtained using alternative dependent variables and varying data sampling frequencies, which was further reinforced by causality checks through external shocks and instrumental variables. Cross-sectional tests indicate that the disciplinary role played by short sellers is stronger in firms with weaker corporate governance, greater financial constraints, and less incentivized managers. After excluding alternative explanations, we find that the positive impact of short selling on corporate risk-taking is determined by investor attention drawn by short sellers, confirming the disciplinary role of the market's invisible hand. More tests confirm the positive effects of our primary findings. This study provides robust empirical evidence that short sellers have an impact on favorable long-term corporate risk-taking and offers valuable insights for fiscal policy and academic discussion.

中文翻译：

---

卖空威胁是否可能影响企业的风险承担？来自股权借贷供应的证据


本研究考察了股权借贷供应是加强还是削弱了企业冒险行为。证据表明，事前卖空可以无意中充当外部治理机制，以惩戒自私自利、规避风险的经理。这表明，从 2006 年到 2017 年，美国公司的长期风险承担行为有所增加。使用替代因变量和不同的数据采样频率获得的一致结果证实了我们研究结果的稳健性，通过外部冲击和工具变量进行的因果关系检查进一步加强了这一点。横断面检验表明，在公司治理较弱、财务约束较大且管理者激励较少的公司中，卖空者所发挥的纪律作用更强。在排除其他解释后，我们发现卖空对企业风险承担的积极影响取决于卖空者吸引的投资者注意力，证实了市场这只看不见的手的纪律作用。更多的测试证实了我们主要发现的积极影响。本研究提供了强有力的实证证据，证明卖空者对有利的长期企业冒险行为有影响，并为财政政策和学术讨论提供了有价值的见解。