Growing risks and potential disruptions in global supply chains underscore the urgent need to enhance supply resilience. This research focuses on relationship-specific investments by suppliers that target resilience enhancement through performance improvements, cost efficiency, and the establishment of trust. Using a real options framework, we construct a coopetition model between suppliers and manufacturers to investigate how supplier investments and financing decisions are influenced by market uncertainties and bargaining power in the presence of manufacturer subsidies. Our analysis reveals that compared to full equity financing, debt financing by an upstream supplier supported by subsidies from a downstream manufacturer can mitigate underinvestment to some extent. Moreover, in contrast to the existing literature, we find that the effect of leverage on investment timing is non-monotonic. Finally, we identify a U-shaped relationship between suppliers' bargaining power and the timing of relationship-specific investments.

中文翻译：

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不确定性下的最优关系特定投融资和供应链资本结构


全球供应链中日益增长的风险和潜在中断凸显了增强供应弹性的迫切需要。本研究侧重于供应商针对特定关系的投资，旨在通过提高绩效、提高成本效率和建立信任来增强弹性。使用实物期权框架，我们在供应商和制造商之间构建了一个竞合模型，以研究在制造商补贴的情况下，市场不确定性和议价能力如何影响供应商的投融资决策。我们的分析表明，与全额股权融资相比，上游供应商的债务融资由下游制造商的补贴支持，可以在一定程度上缓解投资不足。此外，与现有文献相比，我们发现杠杆对投资时机的影响是非单调的。最后，我们确定了供应商的议价能力与特定关系投资的时间之间的 U 型关系。