Competing online retail platforms frequently function as both agency and reselling channels. This paper explores a manufacturer’s channel selection strategy in the context of downstream platform competition and information sharing, taking into account the platforms’ varying levels of information capability. Our research indicates that the manufacturer opts for a hybrid channel approach. Competing platforms aim to be selected as agency channels by offering information sharing and reduced commission fees. Interestingly, the manufacturer chooses the platform with lesser information capability as her agency channel to gain access to shared demand data, while opting for the platform with greater capability as reselling channel without accessing his demand data. The platform with inferior information capability is more inclined to establish a revenue-sharing partnership with the manufacturer to mitigate risks, leading him to decrease his commission rate to attract the manufacturer to select him as the agency channel. We demonstrate that, under conditions of demand uncertainty, a significant distinction between agency and reselling channels lies in the distribution of risk, i.e., whether the platform assumes the risk alone or shares it with the manufacturer. Furthermore, we highlight the free-ride effect, wherein an agency platform can benefit from his rival’s superior information capability. As a result, a complex relationship, characterized by both cooperation and rivalry, may develop between the two platforms.

中文翻译：

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在具有不同信息能力的竞争平台之间共享信息


竞争的在线零售平台经常充当代理和转售渠道。本文探讨了制造商在下游平台竞争和信息共享背景下的渠道选择策略，同时考虑到平台不同层次的信息能力。我们的研究表明，制造商选择了混合渠道方法。竞争平台旨在通过提供信息共享和降低佣金来被选为代理渠道。有趣的是，制造商选择信息能力较弱的平台作为她的代理渠道来访问共享需求数据，同时选择功能更强的平台作为转售渠道，而不访问他的需求数据。信息能力较差的平台更倾向于与制造商建立收益分成合作伙伴关系以降低风险，导致其降低佣金率以吸引制造商选择他作为代理渠道。我们证明，在需求不确定的情况下，代理渠道和转售渠道之间的显着区别在于风险的分布，即平台是单独承担风险还是与制造商分担风险。此外，我们强调了搭便车效应，其中代理平台可以从竞争对手卓越的信息能力中受益。因此，两个平台之间可能会发展出一种以合作和竞争为特征的复杂关系。