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Theories of consciousness from the perspective of an embedded processes view.
Psychological Review ( IF 5.1 ) Pub Date : 2024-12-12 , DOI: 10.1037/rev0000510
Nelson Cowan,Nick I Ahmed,Chenye Bao,Mackenzie N Cissne,Ronald D Flores,Roman M Gutierrez,Braden Hayse,Madison L Musich,Hamid Nourbakhshi,Nanan Nuraini,Emily E Schroeder,Neyla Sfeir,Emilie Sparrow,Luísa Superbia-Guimarães

Considerable recent research in neurosciences has dealt with the topic of consciousness, even though there is still disagreement about how to identify and classify conscious states. Recent behavioral work on the topic also exists. We survey recent behavioral and neuroscientific literature with the aims of commenting on strengths and weaknesses of the literature and mapping new directions and recommendations for experimental psychologists. We reconcile this literature with a view of human information processing (Cowan, 1988; Cowan et al., 2024) in which a capacity-limited focus of attention is embedded within the activated portion of long-term memory, with dual bottom-up and top-down control of the focus of attention. None of the many extant theories fully captures what we propose as the organization of conscious thought at cognitive and neural levels. It seems clear that information from various cognitive functions, based on signals from various brain areas, is integrated into a conscious whole. In our new proposal, the integration involves funneling information to a hub or focus of attention neurally centered in the parietal lobes and functionally connected to areas representing the currently attended information. This funneling process (bringing information from diverse sensory and frontal sources to contact a small parietal area where attended information is coordinated and combined) may be the converse of global broadcasting, from other proposals (Baars et al., 2021; Baars & Franklin, 2003; Dehaene & Changeux, 2011). The proposed system incorporates many principles from previous research and theorization and strives toward a resolution of the relation between consciousness and attention. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

中文翻译:


从嵌入式过程观点看意识理论。



神经科学中最近的大量研究都涉及意识这个话题,尽管在如何识别和分类意识状态方面仍然存在分歧。最近关于该主题的行为研究也存在。我们调查了最近的行为和神经科学文献,目的是评论文献的优缺点,并为实验心理学家绘制新的方向和建议。我们将这些文献与人类信息处理的观点相协调(Cowan,1988 年;Cowan et al., 2024),其中容量受限的注意力焦点嵌入在长期记忆的激活部分,对注意力焦点进行自下而上和自上而下的双重控制。许多现存的理论中没有一个能完全捕捉到我们提出的在认知和神经层面上组织有意识思维。很明显,来自各种认知功能的信息,基于来自各个大脑区域的信号,被整合到一个有意识的整体中。在我们的新提案中,整合涉及将信息汇集到以顶叶为中心的神经中心或注意力焦点,并在功能上连接到代表当前参与信息的区域。这个漏斗过程(从不同的感觉和额叶来源带来信息以接触一个小的顶叶区域,在那里有人参与的信息被协调和组合)可能是来自其他提案的全球广播的反面(Baars et al., 2021;Baars & Franklin, 2003;Dehaene & Changeux,2011 年)。拟议的系统融合了以前研究和理论化的许多原则,并努力解决意识和注意力之间的关系。(PsycInfo 数据库记录 (c) 2024 APA,保留所有权利)。
更新日期:2024-12-12
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