To address stakeholders’ interests, firms increasingly adopt a dual-purpose agenda, typically involving the pursuit of profits and consumer surplus (CS). This study considers a supply chain dynamic involving a retailer and a national brand (NB) manufacturer, both potentially pursuing dual purposes, to investigate how their dual-purpose nature influences the introduction and quality strategies of the retailer’s store brand (SB). Our findings show that only the retailer pursuing CS has no impact on SB quality. However, if the NB manufacturer pursues CS, SB quality declines irrespective of the retailer’s stance. Interestingly, the for-profit retailer experiences reduced profits from SB introduction when also pursuing CS and expressing a high interest in it. Conversely, SB introduction enhances the dual-purpose manufacturer’s utility when its interest in CS is relatively high. The introduction of SB may lead to unintended price and payoff implications, with the manufacturer’s profit and the wholesale price exhibiting non-monotonic relationships with its interest in CS. Consequently, compared to the for-profit scenario, this may elevate the wholesale price, exacerbating the double marginalization effect. Additionally, when the retailer pursues CS, supply chain profit may increase because of the mitigated double marginalization effect, resulting from an unconventional reduction in retail markup rather than wholesale price. Our findings suggest that manufacturers pursuing CS could strategically alleviate profit losses stemming from retailers’ SB introduction. However, retailers should exercise caution when simultaneously introducing a SB and pursuing CS from a profitability standpoint.

中文翻译：

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双重用途在零售商的商店品牌介绍和供应链中的质量策略中的作用


为了满足利益相关者的利益，公司越来越多地采用双重目的的议程，通常涉及追求利润和消费者剩余 （CS）。本研究考虑了涉及零售商和国家品牌 （NB） 制造商的供应链动态，两者都可能追求双重目的，以调查它们的双重目的性质如何影响零售商商店品牌 （SB） 的推出和质量策略。我们的研究结果表明，只有追求 CS 的零售商对 SB 质量没有影响。但是，如果 NB 制造商追求 CS，则无论零售商的立场如何，SB 质量都会下降。有趣的是，这家营利性零售商在追求 CS 并对其表示高度兴趣时，从 SB 引入中减少了利润。相反，当 CS 的兴趣相对较高时，SB 的引入增强了两用制造商的效用。SB 的引入可能会导致意想不到的价格和回报影响，制造商的利润和批发价格与其在 CS 中的利益表现出非单调的关系。因此，与营利性情景相比，这可能会提高批发价格，从而加剧双重边际化效应。此外，当零售商追求 CS 时，供应链利润可能会增加，因为零售加价而不是批发价格的非常规降低导致了双重边缘化效应的缓解。我们的研究结果表明，追求 CS 的制造商可以从战略上减轻零售商引入 SB 造成的利润损失。但是，零售商在同时引入 SB 并从盈利能力的角度追求 CS 时应谨慎行事。