We study the incentives of an airline and a high-speed rail (HSR) operator to incur sunk costs and cooperate in a hub-and-spoke network with a congested hub airport. Contrary to common wisdom, we find that a high delay cost at the hub reduces incentives to cooperate, and that hub traffic may increase after cooperation. We show that airline-HSR cooperation improves consumer surplus, since higher passenger volumes yield more benefits than incremental delay costs at the hub. We also show that transport operators underinvest in airline-HSR cooperation because (depending on mode substitution and the delay cost) they may not be willing to incur sunk costs when social welfare would be higher under cooperation. We then investigate the rationale and implications of airport price regulation. Finally, we show that transport operators’ and the airport company’s interests may be misaligned, and that airport managers can play a role in encouraging or hindering airline-HSR cooperation, depending on their ability to commit to the airport charge.

中文翻译：

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航空公司与高铁合作、枢纽拥堵和机场行为


我们研究了航空公司和高铁 （HSR） 运营商承担沉没成本并与拥堵的枢纽机场合作建立轴辐式网络的激励措施。与常识相反，我们发现枢纽的高延迟成本会降低合作的动力，并且合作后枢纽流量可能会增加。我们表明，航空公司与高铁的合作提高了消费者剩余，因为更高的客运量比枢纽的增量延误成本产生更多的好处。我们还表明，运输运营商对航空公司与高铁合作的投资不足，因为（取决于模式替代和延误成本）当合作下的社会福利会更高时，他们可能不愿意承担沉没成本。然后，我们调查了机场价格监管的基本原理和影响最后，我们表明运输运营商和机场公司的利益可能会错位，机场经理可以在鼓励或阻碍航空公司与高铁合作方面发挥作用，这取决于他们承诺机场收费的能力。