The USA, alongside many other nations, presently faces a vital policy choice: should it adopt the global minimum tax proposed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, purportedly to ensure basic levels of corporate taxation of large multinationals? I set out a framework for analyzing and predicting global minimum tax adoption by self-interested, national-income-maximizing governments. Contrary to both popular and prior scholarly claims, the global minimum tax is incentive incompatible: countries from which multinationals originate will likely suffer deep losses; the tax’s purported enforcement tool, even read in an aggressive, controversial fashion, is ineffective. The global minimum tax may unravel despite initial adoption. (JEL codes: F23, F55, H25, H73, H87, K34).

中文翻译：

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采用全球最低税的战略激励措施


美国和许多其他国家一样，目前面临着一个至关重要的政策选择：它是否应该采用经济合作与发展组织（Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development）提出的全球最低税，据称是为了确保大型跨国公司的基本公司税？我提出了一个框架，用于分析和预测自私自利、实现国民收入最大化的政府对全球最低税的采用情况。与流行的和以前的学术主张相反，全球最低税是激励不相容的：跨国公司来源国可能会遭受重大损失;该税所声称的执行工具，即使以激进、有争议的方式解读，也是无效的。尽管最初采用，但全球最低税可能会瓦解。（JEL 代码：F23、F55、H25、H73、H87、K34）。