Materially powerful states tend to dominate both the creation of international organizations (IOs) as well as subsequent IO policymaking. Materially weak states are nevertheless expected to participate in IOs since it is generally assumed that they will still profit from cooperation and prefer power to be exercised through institutions. Yet, we know surprisingly little about how exactly institutional rules protect weak states from the powerful in IOs. This paper develops a theory of institutional design that specifies the institutional power equilibrium at the heart of IOs’ constitutional treaties. Through the inclusion of veto or exit rights, weak states obtain formal safeguards against exploitation by the powerful during an IO’s operation. This expectation of a power equilibrium in IOs’ design is borne out in design patterns within the constitutional treaties of IOs created between 1945 and 2005. Our results indicate that the distribution of power among an IO’s founding members indeed affects the inclusion of institutional safeguards in their constitutional treaties and that veto and exit rights are functional substitutes in this regard. Our findings matter since the institutional power equilibrium at IO creation has important implications for relations between the materially powerful and the weak during IO operations.

中文翻译：

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为弱者提供保险：国际组织中的制度权力平衡


物质上强大的国家往往主导着国际组织 （IO） 的创建以及随后的国际组织政策制定。尽管如此，物质上较弱的国家仍应参与 IO，因为人们通常认为它们仍将从合作中获利，并且更愿意通过机构行使权力。然而，令人惊讶的是，我们对制度规则究竟如何保护弱国免受 IO 中的强国的侵害知之甚少。本文发展了一种制度设计理论，该理论指定了 IO 宪法条约核心的制度权力均衡。通过包含否决权或退出权，弱国获得了正式的保障，防止在 IO 的运作期间受到强国的剥削。这种对 IO 设计中权力均衡的期望在 1945 年至 2005 年间制定的 IO 宪法条约的设计模式中得到了证实。我们的结果表明，IO 创始成员之间的权力分配确实影响了在其宪法条约中纳入制度保障措施，而否决权和退出权是这方面的功能性替代品。我们的研究结果很重要，因为 IO 创建时的制度权力平衡对 IO 运营期间物质强者和弱者之间的关系具有重要影响。