Constitutivists often argue that agency is inescapable. This is supposed to, among other things, explain why norms that are constitutive of agency are forceful. But can some form of inescapability do that? I consider four types of inescapability—psychological, further factor, standpoint, and plight—and evaluate whether they manage to explain four necessary features of normative force: that it does not vary with desire change, that ought-implies-can and can-fail, and that we are criticizable for failing to live up to forceful norms. The former three all fail to explain some of these features, but a version of plight inescapability does, in fact, appear able to explain them all. This is good news for constitutivists. The catch? The plight inescapability explanation generates relativism. This leaves constitutivists at a choice point: accept the plight inescapability explanation of normative force and relativism—or give up the plight inescapability explanation.

中文翻译：

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建构主义的困境：不可避免性、规范性和相对主义


建构论者经常争辩说，能动性是不可避免的。除其他外，这应该解释为什么构成能动性的规范是强制性的。但某种形式的不可避免能做到这一点吗？我考虑了四种类型的不可避免性——心理、进一步因素、立场和困境——并评估它们是否能够解释规范力量的四个必要特征：它不随欲望的变化而变化，应该-暗示-可以和可以-失败，以及我们因未能达到强有力的规范而受到批评。前三个都无法解释其中的一些特征，但事实上，困境的不可避免性版本似乎确实能够解释它们的全部。这对选民来说是个好消息。问题是什么？困境的 inesability 解释产生了相对主义。这让建构论者处于一个选择点：接受规范性力量和相对主义的困境不可避免性解释——或者放弃困境不可避免的解释。