Conceptualism is the view that at least some perceptual representation is conceptual. This paper considers a prominent recent argument against Conceptualism due to Ned Block. Block's argument appeals to patterns of color representation in infants, alleging that infants exhibit categorical perception of color while failing to deploy concepts of color categories. Accordingly, the perceptual representation of color categories in infancy must be non-conceptual. This argument is distinctive insofar as it threatens not only the view that all perception is conceptual, but also views that restrict the Conceptualist thesis to perceptual categorization. However, I contend that it fails at two stages. Block's arguments for the perceptual representation of color categories in infancy, and against color concept deployment in infancy, are unpersuasive. Thus, Block has not vanquished Conceptualism. I draw out implications for debates about the perception–cognition border and for the question of whether explicit categorization occurs in perception.

中文翻译：

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知觉分类和知觉概念


概念主义认为至少一些感知表征是概念性的。本文考虑了 Ned Block 最近反对概念主义的一个突出论点。Block 的论点诉诸于婴儿的颜色表示模式，声称婴儿表现出对颜色的分类感知，而未能部署颜色类别的概念。因此，婴儿期颜色类别的感知表征必须是非概念性的。这个论点是独特的，因为它不仅威胁到所有感知都是概念的观点，而且威胁到将概念主义论点限制在知觉分类的观点。然而，我认为它在两个阶段都失败了。Block 支持婴儿期颜色类别的感知表示，以及反对婴儿期颜色概念部署的论点，都没有说服力。因此，布洛克并没有战胜概念主义。我为关于感知-认知边界的辩论以及感知中是否发生显式分类的问题提供了启示。