Do International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending programs increase repression in borrowing countries? We argue that repression worsens when autocratic governments enter conditional lending arrangements with the IMF. Autocracies are likelier than democracies to harshly crackdown during episodes of heightened protest and unrest triggered by IMF-mandated adjustment and structural reform programs. But harsh repression of anticipated spikes in dissent spurred by liberalization-oriented IMF conditions may also be used by autocrats to proactively signal their commitment to preserve regime insiders’ advantages. We present several tests of the arguments in the article. In the first test, we use a compound instrumental variable to estimate the conditional difference in human rights scores between IMF program participation and non-participation in both democratic and autocratic country-years (1975–2014). We do not find evidence for clear links between IMF program participation and human rights in developing democracies. In autocracies, however, the relationship between IMF lending programs and human rights respect is consistently negative and significant. In further tests, we isolate the impact of different types of IMF conditionality. Evidence suggests that IMF programs with more numerous structural reforms (namely, pro-privatization conditions) are associated with lower human rights protections in autocratic countries.

中文翻译：

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国际货币基金组织贷款计划与专制国家的镇压


国际货币基金组织 （IMF） 的贷款计划是否加剧了对借款国的压迫？我们认为，当专制政府与国际货币基金组织达成有条件贷款安排时，镇压会恶化。专制国家比民主国家更有可能在国际货币基金组织授权的调整和结构性改革计划引发的抗议和动荡加剧时进行严厉镇压。但是，独裁者也可能利用以自由化为导向的国际货币基金组织条件所刺激的预期异议激增的严厉镇压，来主动表明他们致力于维护政权内部人士的优势。我们在文章中对论点进行了几项测试。在第一次测试中，我们使用复合工具变量来估计民主和专制国家年份（1975-2014 年）参与和不参与 IMF 计划之间人权得分的条件差异。我们没有找到证据表明国际货币基金组织参与与发展中民主国家的人权之间存在明确联系。然而，在专制国家，国际货币基金组织贷款计划与人权尊重之间的关系始终是消极而重要的。在进一步的测试中，我们分离了不同类型的 IMF 条件的影响。有证据表明，国际货币基金组织（IMF）的计划具有更多的结构性改革（即支持私有化的条件）与专制国家的较低人权保护有关。