This research note introduces new global data on self-coups—rapid moves by sitting executive leaders to “overthrow” their own governments and illegitimately maintain or extend power. Self-coups are distinct from ordinary coups (sudden illegal attempts by other elites to topple the sitting executive) and overlap with incumbent takeovers (incremental quasi-legal steps by the sitting executive to amass power). Still, there is conceptual discord about what delineates self-coups and a resultant lack of consensus about basic facts, even about where and when self-coups have happened. To provide a firmer foundation for investigating the self-coup phenomenon systematically, I draw from eight datasets and original data collection and coding to present comprehensive data on 147 individual events (plus 90 candidate incidents that did not fully meet the criteria) in the 1950–2022 period. The dataset provides information on the perpetrators, targets, flashpoint dates, and methods of these events. Illustrative statistical analysis suggests that following a self-coup, the level of international economic aid tends to have a negative effect on the probability that a country will hold competitive elections. Future research may apply these data for a better understanding of the causes of self-coups and the long-term effects of self-coups on political and economic development.

中文翻译：

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自上而下的权力攫取：自我政变的数据库


本研究报告介绍了有关自我政变的新全球数据，即在任行政领导人迅速采取行动“推翻”本国政府并非法维持或扩大权力。自我政变不同于普通政变（其他精英突然非法企图推翻现任行政官），并且与现任接管（现任行政官为积累权力而采取的渐进式准法律步骤）重叠。尽管如此，关于什么是自我政变仍然存在概念上的分歧，因此对基本事实缺乏共识，甚至对自我政变发生的地点和时间也缺乏共识。为了为系统地调查自我政变现象提供更坚实的基础，我利用八个数据集和原始数据收集和编码，提供了 1950 年至 2022 年期间 147 个单个事件（加上 90 个不完全符合标准的候选事件）的综合数据。该数据集提供了有关这些事件的肇事者、目标、爆发点日期和方法的信息。说明性统计分析表明，在自我政变之后，国际经济援助的水平往往会对一个国家举行竞争性选举的可能性产生负面影响。未来的研究可能会应用这些数据来更好地了解自我政变的原因以及自我政变对政治和经济发展的长期影响。