This article develops a dual-oligopoly differential game model to analyze how technological impacts influence product market competition. This model undertakes a systematic examination of the strategic balancing act enterprises engage in when confronted with technological innovation opportunities, weighing market returns against information disclosure costs in the context of IPO decision-making. The findings reveal that the temporal dimension of technological catch-up and the firms’ intrinsic innovation capabilities are pivotal determinants of IPO timing. Specifically, enterprises that have achieved rapid technological parity and possess robust innovative capacities are more prone to expedite IPOs, seeking to secure funding for further technological advancements and market expansion endeavors. Conversely, elevated information disclosure costs may incentivize companies to postpone IPOs, aiming to shield their technological assets and market strategies from premature competitor scrutiny. Additionally, the study highlights the paradoxical influence of intense market competition: while it incentivizes early IPOs to bolster resource acquisition for competitive strategies, it also exacerbates the detrimental effects of disclosure costs on IPO timing. In conclusion, this investigation not only contributes to the theoretical corpus on IPO decision-making but also offers pragmatic guidance for corporate executives in crafting IPO strategies and serves as a valuable reference for fostering the sustainable development of capital markets.

中文翻译：

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技术创新驱动型企业的战略 IPO 时机：市场回报、披露成本和行业动态的差异化博弈分析


本文开发了一个双重寡头垄断差分博弈模型，以分析技术影响如何影响产品市场竞争。该模型对企业在面临技术创新机会时所采取的战略平衡行为进行了系统审查，在 IPO 决策的背景下权衡了市场回报与信息披露成本。研究结果表明，技术赶超的时间维度和公司的内在创新能力是 IPO 时机的关键决定因素。具体而言，已快速实现技术平价并拥有强大创新能力的企业更倾向于加快 IPO，以寻求资金以进一步推动技术进步和市场扩张。相反，信息披露成本上升可能会激励公司推迟 IPO，旨在保护其技术资产和市场战略免受竞争对手的过早审查。此外，该研究强调了激烈市场竞争的自相矛盾的影响：虽然它激励早期 IPO 支持为竞争战略获取资源，但也加剧了披露成本对 IPO 时间的不利影响。综上所述，本研究不仅为IPO决策的理论语料库提供了参考，也为企业高管制定IPO策略提供了务实的指导，为促进资本市场的可持续发展提供了有价值的参考。