Philosophical Studies ( IF 1.1 ) Pub Date : 2024-12-10 , DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02265-w Juan F. Álvarez
Many philosophers endorse “exclusionism”, the view that no instance of relearning qualifies as a case of genuine remembering, and vice versa. Appealing to simulationist, distributed causalist, and trace minimalist theories of remembering, I develop three conditional arguments against exclusionism. First, if simulationism is right to hold that some cases of remembering involve reliance on post-event testimonial information, then remembering does not exclude relearning. Second, if distributed causalism is right to hold that memory traces are promiscuous, then remembering does not exclude relearning. Finally, if trace minimalism is right to hold that vicarious experiences sometimes produce the minimal traces that ground remembering, then remembering does not exclude relearning. While advocates of these theories might incorporate additional conditions designed to accommodate exclusionism, the only reason they can appeal to in favor of doing so is intuition: neither the fundamental components of the theories nor the empirical results on which they are based provide a reason to endorse exclusionism. An investigation of exclusionism thus raises metaphilosophical questions, so far overlooked in philosophy of memory, about the appropriate role of intuition in theorizing about remembering.
中文翻译:
记住与再学习:反对排斥主义
许多哲学家赞同“排他主义”,即没有重新学习的例子有资格成为真正记忆的情况,反之亦然。诉诸模拟主义、分布式因果主义和微量极简主义记忆理论,我提出了三个反对排斥主义的条件论点。首先,如果模拟主义认为某些记忆案例涉及对事后证词信息的依赖是正确的,那么记忆并不排除重新学习。其次,如果分布式因果论认为记忆痕迹是混杂的,那么记住并不排除重新学习。最后,如果痕迹极简主义认为替代体验有时会产生以记忆为基础的最小痕迹是正确的,那么记住并不排除重新学习。虽然这些理论的倡导者可能会纳入旨在适应排斥主义的额外条件,但他们唯一可以诉诸支持排斥主义的理由是直觉:这些理论的基本组成部分和它们所基于的实证结果都没有提供支持排斥主义的理由。因此,对排他主义的调查提出了迄今为止在记忆哲学中被忽视的元哲学问题,即直觉在记忆理论化中的适当作用。