In the prevalent online marketplaces, vendors manage daily operations while e-commerce platforms (EPs) that provide auxiliary services and charge commission fees. Two commission policies are examined in this article: Fixed Commission Policy (FCP), involving a fixed usage fee, and Ordinary Commission Policy (OCP), incorporating an additional fee proportional to sales revenue alongside the fixed usage fee, with this proportion referred to as the commission rate. We develop a two-stage game-theoretical model of an e-commerce supply chain, wherein the EP sets the commission policy and a risk-sensitive vendor determines its stock level. The vendor's risk attitude is characterized by three key preferences: reference preference, utility weight preference, and loss aversion preference. Under reasonable assumptions, we establish the existence and uniqueness of the game equilibrium, yielding several key insights: (i) Vendor preferences significantly influence the commission policy, with reference preference being central in shaping the optimal commission rate. Specifically, while the FCP is optimal for risk-neutral vendors, it may not be suitable when vendors are risk-sensitive. (ii) The ratio of unit cost to retail price is the primary driver of variations in optimal commission rate. Moreover, the optimal commission rate tends to decrease as this ratio increases. (iii) In the presence of risk sensitivity, a commission policy maximizing the EP's profit can lead to Pareto improvement compared to one aimed at centralized profit maximization. Our analysis offers valuable insights into the design of commission policies for EPs, providing credible explanations for various economic phenomena associated with these policies in e-commerce practices.

中文翻译：

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供应商偏好对电商平台佣金政策的影响


在流行的在线市场中，供应商管理日常运营，而提供辅助服务并收取佣金的电子商务平台 （EP） 则负责管理。本文研究了两种佣金政策：固定佣金政策 （FCP），涉及固定使用费，以及普通佣金政策 （OCP），在固定使用费的基础上，还包括与销售收入成比例的额外费用，该比例称为佣金率。我们开发了一个电子商务供应链的两阶段博弈论模型，其中 EP 制定佣金政策，风险敏感型供应商确定其库存水平。供应商的风险态度以三个关键偏好为特征：参考偏好、效用权重偏好和损失厌恶偏好。在合理的假设下，我们确定了博弈均衡的存在性和唯一性，从而得出了几个关键见解：（i） 供应商偏好会显着影响佣金政策，其中参考偏好是塑造最佳佣金率的核心。具体而言，虽然 FCP 最适合风险中立的供应商，但当供应商对风险敏感时，它可能并不适合。（ii） 单位成本与零售价的比率是最佳佣金率变化的主要驱动因素。此外，随着该比率的增加，最佳佣金率往往会降低。（iii） 在存在风险敏感性的情况下，与旨在集中利润最大化的佣金政策相比，最大化 EP 利润的佣金政策可以导致帕累托改进。我们的分析为 EP 佣金政策的设计提供了有价值的见解，为电子商务实践中与这些政策相关的各种经济现象提供了可信的解释。