Understanding human responses to epidemic outbreaks—particularly to control measures such as vaccination—is essential for accurately modeling the complex interplay between epidemics and human behavior. Through the framework of evolutionary vaccination games, we explore how individuals' opinions influence vaccine uptake attitudes under imperfect vaccination and, in turn, how this affects to the spread of an epidemic. In our model, individuals update their vaccination strategies by comparing their payoff with one of their neighbors. Individuals payoffs have two contributions regulated by the conformity parameter α. When α→0, the payoff is based on a classical assessment of relative vaccine-to-disease costs Cr, whereas as α→1, individuals have their payoffs influenced by the assortativeness of peers' opinions on the vaccine. The epidemic stage is described by the susceptible-infected-recovery (SIR) model. Extensive simulations have shown that on homogeneous systems, a small region in the parameter space (α,Cr) emerges where the vaccination dilemma can be totally overcome. However, it is also found that social influence tends to promote vaccine hesitancy except for small Cr. Abrupt phase transitions are observed leading the system from high vaccination coverage to full vaccine hesitancy. On heterogeneous networks, the vaccination dilemma has not only been overcome to some extent, but has also demonstrated bi-stability in specific regions. Our results demonstrate the significant impact of social influence on vaccination.

中文翻译：

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免疫不完善下社会同伴对疫苗犹豫的影响


了解人类对流行病爆发的反应（尤其是对疫苗接种等控制措施的反应）对于准确模拟流行病与人类行为之间复杂的相互作用至关重要。通过进化疫苗接种游戏的框架，我们探讨了在不完美的疫苗接种下，个人的意见如何影响疫苗接种态度，进而如何影响流行病的传播。在我们的模型中，个人通过将他们的收益与他们的一个邻居进行比较来更新他们的疫苗接种策略。个人收益有两个贡献，由一致性参数 α 调节。当 α→0 时，收益基于对疫苗与疾病相对成本 Cr 的经典评估，而当 α→1 时，个人的收益受到同龄人对疫苗的各种看法的影响。流行阶段由易感感染恢复 （SIR） 模型描述。广泛的模拟表明，在均质系统上，参数空间 （α，Cr） 中出现一个小区域，可以完全克服疫苗接种困境。然而，研究还发现，除了小的 Cr 外，社会影响往往会促进疫苗犹豫。观察到突然的相变导致系统从高疫苗接种覆盖率到完全疫苗犹豫。在异构网络上，疫苗接种困境不仅在一定程度上得到了克服，而且在特定区域也表现出双稳定性。我们的结果表明，社会影响对疫苗接种有重大影响。