Improving recovery efficiency is a key concern for collectors in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with remanufacturing, as customers often consider the inconvenience of recycling channels when returning used products. This issue profoundly affects collectors’ capacity to recover materials. In a two-period CLSC with remanufacturing, including a manufacturer and a retailer, we develop game-theoretical models in the centralized and decentralized scenarios and compare the optimal solutions, consumer surplus, social welfare and environmental impact of different models through analytical and numerical analysis. Our aim is to examine firms’ dynamic pricing strategies and collection investment decisions by considering customers’ perception of channel inconvenience. There are four main findings. Firstly, in the centralized model and the retailer collection model, the decision-maker lowers the retail price in the first period. However, in the competitive collection model, the manufacturer and the retailer raise the wholesale and retail prices in the first period, respectively. Secondly, in the retailer collection model, as the recycling revenue increases, the manufacturer, although not involved in collecting, the profit also increases due to the free-rider behavior. Thirdly, in the competitive collection model, when the remanufacturing cost savings is relatively high, the collection investment of the manufacturer is much larger than that of the retailer, resulting in the retailer failing to collect any product and giving up collecting. Finally, the collection competition improves the total collection rate and environmental performance but reduces the profit of the manufacturer and the retailer, as well as the consumer surplus and social welfare. Therefore, we design a two-part tariff contract to coordinate the decentralized model and effectively improve the performance of the supply chain.

中文翻译：

---

考虑渠道不便的两期闭环供应链中的最优定价和收款决策


提高回收效率是再制造闭环供应链 （CLSC） 中收集商的主要关注点，因为客户在退回旧产品时通常会考虑回收渠道的不便。这个问题深刻地影响了收集者回收资料的能力。在包括制造商和零售商在内的两个再制造的 CLSC 阶段中，我们在集中式和分散式场景中开发博弈论模型，并通过分析和数值分析比较不同模型的最佳解决方案、消费者剩余、社会福利和环境影响。我们的目标是通过考虑客户对渠道不便的看法来检查公司的动态定价策略和收款投资决策。有四个主要发现。首先，在集中式模型和零售商集合模型中，决策者在第一阶段降低零售价。然而，在竞争性收款模式中，制造商和零售商分别在第一阶段提高批发价和零售价。其次，在零售商收集模式中，随着回收收入的增加，制造商虽然不参与收集，但由于搭便车行为，利润也增加了。第三，在竞争性收集模式中，当再制造成本节省相对较高时，制造商的收集投入远大于零售商，导致零售商无法收集任何产品并放弃收集。最后，收集竞赛提高了总收集率和环境绩效，但降低了制造商和零售商的利润，以及消费者剩余和社会福利。 因此，我们设计了一个由两部分组成的关税合同，以协调分散模式并有效提高供应链的绩效。