This study explores the impact of information sharing on green supply chains with horizontal competition, addressing an important yet underexplored issue. Using a Stackelberg game framework, we examine green product design and information-sharing dynamics in a supply chain consisting of a common retailer and two competing manufacturers. The retailer decides whether to share green demand information with manufacturers, who then determine product greenness, while the retailer sets the retail price. The findings reveal that information sharing can have mixed effects on manufacturers’ profitability, depending on competitive dynamics and demand sensitivity to product greenness. Additionally, the interplay between information sharing and green design strategies emphasizes the importance of aligning product design decisions with optimal information-sharing practices. While information sharing consistently improves environmental performance in non-competitive settings, it can lead to negative environmental outcomes in competitive scenarios. Extending the analysis to cases where manufacturers control wholesale pricing and information is shared sequentially, the findings remain robust. This study highlights the dual role of information sharing as a driver of supply chain efficiency and a potential source of environmental inefficiencies in competitive markets. The results offer actionable insights for crafting green supply chain strategies that balance economic and environmental objectives.

中文翻译：

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在横向竞争的供应链中实现绿色设计和信息共享


本研究探讨了信息共享对同业竞争的绿色供应链的影响，解决了一个重要但未被充分探索的问题。使用 Stackelberg 博弈框架，我们研究了由一家共同零售商和两家竞争制造商组成的供应链中的绿色产品设计和信息共享动态。零售商决定是否与制造商共享绿色需求信息，然后制造商确定产品的绿色性，而零售商设定零售价。研究结果表明，信息共享可能对制造商的盈利能力产生混合影响，具体取决于竞争动态和需求对产品绿色性的敏感性。此外，信息共享和绿色设计策略之间的相互作用强调了使产品设计决策与最佳信息共享实践保持一致的重要性。虽然信息共享在非竞争环境中可以持续改善环境绩效，但在竞争情况下可能会导致负面的环境结果。将分析扩展到制造商控制批发定价且信息按顺序共享的情况，研究结果仍然稳健。本研究强调了信息共享的双重作用，即供应链效率的驱动力和竞争性市场中环境效率低下的潜在来源。研究结果为制定平衡经济和环境目标的绿色供应链战略提供了可操作的见解。