This paper develops a game-theoretical model to investigate the adoption of personalized pricing in a supply chain with a common retailer and multiple suppliers. We first analyze the optimal personalized pricing strategy for the retailer and then examine its economic impacts on both suppliers and the entire supply chain, aiming to provide insights for supply chain managers regarding the adoption of personalized pricing strategy. We find that the personalized pricing strategy for the retailer depends critically on the degree of product differentiation between two suppliers. If the differentiation level is high, the retailer adopts personalized pricing for both products, which enhances suppliers’ profits and also enables the entire supply chain to achieve its maximum profit. If the differentiation level is moderate, the retailer adopts personalized pricing for only one product, even if both products are ex-ante symmetric. This pricing strategy benefits (may harm) the supplier whose products are priced differently (uniformly), deviating from the strategy preferred by the entire supply chain and therefore warranting special attention. If the differentiation level is low, the retailer again adopts personalized pricing for both products. However, this pricing strategy may harm upstream suppliers by intensifying upstream competition, although it benefits the retailer and the entire channel. Consequently, channel members may have inconsistent preferences for personalized pricing. Our work underscores that the downstream personalized pricing strategies are not always optimal for upstream suppliers and the entire supply chain, thereby holding significance for supply chain managers aiming to adopt personalized pricing for greater profits.

中文翻译：

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在与共同零售商的供应链中采用个性化定价


本文开发了一个博弈论模型，以研究在具有共同零售商和多个供应商的供应链中采用个性化定价的情况。我们首先分析零售商的最佳个性化定价策略，然后研究其对供应商和整个供应链的经济影响，旨在为供应链经理提供有关采用个性化定价策略的见解。我们发现，零售商的个性化定价策略在很大程度上取决于两个供应商之间的产品差异化程度。如果差异化水平高，零售商对两种产品都采用个性化定价，从而提高供应商的利润，也使整个供应链实现其最大利润。如果差异化水平适中，零售商只对一种产品采用个性化定价，即使两种产品都是事前对称的。这种定价策略对供应商有利（可能有害），因为供应商的产品定价不同（一致），偏离了整个供应链首选的策略，因此需要特别关注。如果差异化水平较低，零售商将再次为这两种产品采用个性化定价。然而，这种定价策略可能会加剧上游竞争，从而损害上游供应商，尽管它对零售商和整个渠道都有利。因此，渠道成员对个性化定价的偏好可能不一致。我们的工作强调，下游个性化定价策略并不总是最适合上游供应商和整个供应链的，因此对于旨在采用个性化定价以获得更大利润的供应链管理者具有重要意义。