Why are some autocratic regimes more prone to mass uprisings than others? This article argues that autocratic leaders can mitigate opposition mobilization by strategically appointing opposition leaders to cabinet positions. Drawing on yearly data from autocracies between 1966 and 2020, the article exploits temporal variations in the composition of cabinets and the onset of mass uprisings within autocratic regimes. The findings demonstrate that appointing opposition elites to cabinet positions significantly decreases the likelihood of anti-regime mass uprisings. The results are robust across alternative model specifications and estimation strategies addressing endogeneity concerns. By demonstrating why some autocracies with organized opposition avoid uprisings while others face repeated challenges, this study offers novel insights into how opposition cooptation stabilizes autocratic regimes.

中文翻译：

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专制国家内阁任命的力量：精英拉拢和反政权的群众起义


为什么一些专制政权比其他政权更容易发生大规模起义？本文认为，专制领导人可以通过战略性地任命反对派领导人担任内阁职务来减轻反对派的动员。本文借鉴了 1966 年至 2020 年间专制政权的年度数据，探讨了内阁组成的时间变化和专制政权内部大规模起义的开始。研究结果表明，任命反对派精英担任内阁职务可显著降低反政权大规模起义的可能性。在解决内生性问题的替代模型规范和估计策略中，结果是稳健的。通过说明为什么一些拥有有组织反对派的独裁政权避免起义，而另一些则面临反复的挑战，本研究为反对派拉拢如何稳定独裁政权提供了新的见解。