After-sales service is support provided to a customer after purchase, which potentially leads to higher customer satisfaction and is demand-enhancing. Using a game-theoretic model in which a manufacturer determines its after-sales service and distribution channel strategies in the presence of two asymmetric retailers, we identify channel position as an important criterion in determining the outsourcing of after-sales service. Specifically, outsourcing to a third-party provider, due to its lack of channel interaction, is never an optimal choice for the manufacturer unless the third-party has a significant cost advantage in providing after-sales service. However, because of the channel role of the retailers, the manufacturer outsources to the large retailer rather than undertaking the after-sales service in-house, when the competing small retailer is less competitive and the cost of service provision is high. The trade-off between the manufacturer outsourcing the service and undertaking that in-house involves whether the manufacturer accommodates the small retailer in the market. When service provision is outsourced, the large retailer enjoys a lower wholesale price if the small retailer is present, and therefore the large retailer subsidizes the manufacturer to induce the manufacturer to accommodate the small retailer. However, the manufacturer, when undertaking the service by itself, forgoes the small retailer. Finally, we show that when the manufacturer adopts a multi-retailer distribution channel, the large retailer benefits because improved after-sales service increases demand and consumer valuation of the product. We also demonstrate the robustness of our key results in multiple extensions.

中文翻译：

---

渠道角色对零售商竞争不对称的售后服务外包的影响


售后服务是买家在购买后提供的支持，这可能会提高买家满意度并增强需求。使用博弈论模型，制造商在两个不对称零售商存在的情况下确定其售后服务和分销渠道策略，我们将渠道位置确定为确定售后服务外包的重要标准。具体来说，外包给第三方供应商，由于缺乏渠道互动，除非第三方在提供售后服务方面具有显着的成本优势，否则从来都不是制造商的最佳选择。然而，由于零售商的渠道角色，当竞争的小型零售商竞争力较弱且服务提供成本较高时，制造商将外包给大型零售商，而不是在内部承担售后服务。外包服务的制造商与内部承诺之间的权衡涉及制造商是否在市场上容纳小型零售商。当服务提供外包时，如果有小型零售商在场，大型零售商可享受较低的批发价格，因此大型零售商补贴制造商以诱使制造商适应小型零售商。但是，制造商在自己提供服务时，会放弃小型零售商。最后，我们表明，当制造商采用多零售商分销渠道时，大型零售商会受益，因为改进的售后服务会增加产品的需求和消费者价值。我们还在多个扩展中展示了关键结果的稳健性。