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On the incentive properties of revenue cap regulation
Energy Economics ( IF 13.6 ) Pub Date : 2024-11-20 , DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2024.108052 Dennis L. Weisman
Energy Economics ( IF 13.6 ) Pub Date : 2024-11-20 , DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2024.108052 Dennis L. Weisman
Revenue cap regulation (RCR) is increasingly common in the energy sector because it purportedly reduces the regulated firm's disincentive to promote conservation. In comparison with price-cap regulation, RCR can yield higher prices, greater energy conservation, lower service quality and decreased cost-reducing innovation. The distortionary effects of earnings sharing on investment in cost-reducing innovation may be lessened under RCR. These properties hold even when the regulated firm is further constrained with a price cap that is set equal to the minimum price that satisfies the RCR constraint.
中文翻译:
关于收入上限法规的激励特性
收入上限法规 (RCR) 在能源领域越来越普遍,因为据称它减少了受监管公司促进节能的抑制因素。与价格上限法规相比,RCR 可以产生更高的价格、更大的节能、更低的服务质量和更少的降低成本的创新。在 RCR 下,收益分享对降低成本的创新投资的扭曲影响可能会减轻。即使受监管公司受到价格上限的进一步约束,该价格上限设置为等于满足 RCR 约束的最低价格,这些属性也成立。
更新日期:2024-11-20
中文翻译:
关于收入上限法规的激励特性
收入上限法规 (RCR) 在能源领域越来越普遍,因为据称它减少了受监管公司促进节能的抑制因素。与价格上限法规相比,RCR 可以产生更高的价格、更大的节能、更低的服务质量和更少的降低成本的创新。在 RCR 下,收益分享对降低成本的创新投资的扭曲影响可能会减轻。即使受监管公司受到价格上限的进一步约束,该价格上限设置为等于满足 RCR 约束的最低价格,这些属性也成立。