This paper presents a game-theoretic model where dissidents with heterogeneous abilities and motivations contribute to collective action. A regime demotivates dissidents by preemptively increasing their costs of contributing, using a budget that can be spread across them in any way desired. The regime’s optimal targeting strategy is shown to depend on the (technological) degree of complementarity between dissidents’ contributions. For low complementarity, it is optimal to equalize all dissidents’ strengths (where strength depends both on motivation and ability; tall-poppies strategy). For intermediate complementarity, it is optimal to focus all repression on the most able dissidents (key-player strategy). For high complementarity, it is optimal to focus all repression on the least-motivated dissidents (weakest-link strategy). The range of intermediate complementarities for which the key-player strategy is optimal is larger, the larger heterogeneity in abilities. The paper finds indication for the use of these strategies in concrete examples of preemptive repression.

中文翻译：

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压制谁：高大的罂粟花、关键人物和最薄弱的环节


本文提出了一个博弈论模型，其中具有不同能力和动机的持不同政见者为集体行动做出贡献。一个政权通过先发制人地增加持不同政见者的捐款成本来打击他们的积极性，使用可以以任何希望的方式分配给他们的预算。该政权的最佳定位策略被证明取决于持不同政见者的贡献之间的（技术）互补程度。对于低互补性，最好平衡所有持不同政见者的优势（其中强度取决于动机和能力;高罂粟花策略）。对于中间互补性，最好将所有镇压集中在最有能力的持不同政见者身上（关键参与者策略）。为了实现高度互补性，最好将所有镇压集中在最没有动机的持不同政见者身上（最弱环节策略）。关键玩家策略最优的中间互补性范围越大，能力的异质性就越大。本文在先发制人镇压的具体例子中发现了使用这些策略的迹象。