Suppose I hear from a trusted friend that The Shining is scary. Believing them, I decide not to watch the film. Later, we're talking about the movie and I say, “The Shining is scary!” My assertion here is misleading and inappropriate—I misrepresent myself as having seen the film and judged whether it is scary. But why is this? In this paper, I clarify the scope of the observation, discuss existing explanations of it, and argue that they are all lacking. I argue that the observation is best explained as a particular instance of a general norm which holds that authorities should make assertions about matters in their authority only if they have judged those matters for themselves. Along the way, I offer a theory of judgment which distinguishes it from mere belief.

中文翻译：

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假设我从一个值得信赖的朋友那里听说《闪灵》很可怕。相信他们，我决定不看这部电影。后来，我们谈论这部电影，我说，“《闪灵》太可怕了！我在这里的断言具有误导性和不恰当——我歪曲自己看过这部电影并判断它是否可怕。但这是为什么呢？在本文中，我澄清了观察的范围，讨论了现有的解释，并认为它们都缺乏。我认为，最好将这一观察解释为一般规范的一个特殊实例，该规范认为，只有当当局自己判断了这些事情时，他们才应该对其权威范围内的事务做出断言。在此过程中，我提出了一种判断理论，将其与单纯的信仰区分开来。