The decades‐long rise of economic inequality in the U.S. has led to a growing body of literature examining the role of policy in shaping income differences. We examine one such policy: occupational licensing regulations. Licensing can restrict employment and reduce market competition, which can then inflate wages for those in licensed professions. Existing research demonstrates that occupational licensure does increase wages in specific industries, leading some scholars to argue that licensing makes income inequality worse. We add nuance by arguing that the effect of licensing on inequality is dependent on which occupation classes experience the largest wage premiums. Using a comprehensive over‐time database of state licensing regulations, we first demonstrate that medium‐ and low‐wage jobs garner larger wage premiums than high‐wage occupations. Second, consistent with this result we then show that the occupational licensing regulations have the overall effect of reducing state income inequality. This research contributes to our understanding of the causes of growing inequality and how public policy can shape economic disparities through sometimes unintended and indirect ways.

中文翻译：

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各州的职业许可和收入不平等


美国长达数十年的经济不平等现象导致越来越多的文献研究政策在塑造收入差异中的作用。我们研究了其中一项政策：职业许可法规。许可可以限制就业并减少市场竞争，从而抬高持证专业人士的工资。现有研究表明，职业执照确实会增加特定行业的工资，导致一些学者认为执照会使收入不平等恶化。我们通过论证许可对不平等的影响取决于哪些职业阶层的工资溢价最大来增加细微差别。使用各州许可法规的综合加班数据库，我们首先证明中低薪工作比高薪职业获得更高的工资溢价。其次，与这一结果一致，我们随后表明职业许可法规具有减少国家收入不平等的整体效果。这项研究有助于我们理解不平等加剧的原因，以及公共政策如何通过有时无意和间接的方式塑造经济差距。