This paper shows that angel investor grants encourage new investors to enter the risk finance market, where they syndicate investments with other investors. We argue that this results from the high cost of information acquisition for new investors. New investors bring additional capital into the market but provide little managerial support. However, as these investors join syndicates, ventures can raise larger financing amounts without compromising managerial support. Taken together, these factors positively affect the performance of entrepreneurial ventures. To test our hypotheses, we consider the case of Germany, where the federal government has introduced an investment grant for angel investors. Combining applicant data from the subsidy program with company and ownership information on the quasi-universe of German companies and a large-scale company-level panel survey covering over 900 angel-financed ventures to empirically assess our hypotheses provides strong support for our predictions.

中文翻译：

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放大天使：来自 INVEST 计划的证据


本文表明，天使投资人资助鼓励新投资者进入风险金融市场，在那里他们与其他投资者联合投资。我们认为，这是由于新投资者获取信息的成本高所致。新投资者为市场带来了额外的资金，但提供的管理支持很少。然而，随着这些投资者加入辛迪加，企业可以在不影响管理支持的情况下筹集更大的融资金额。综上所述，这些因素对创业企业的表现产生了积极影响。为了检验我们的假设，我们考虑了德国的情况，德国联邦政府为天使投资人引入了投资补助金。将补贴计划的申请人数据与德国公司准宇宙的公司和所有权信息以及涵盖 900 多家天使投资企业的大规模公司级面板调查相结合，以实证评估我们的假设，为我们的预测提供了强有力的支持。