Reforms that reduce spousal support after divorce are generally thought to reduce the bargaining power of alimony recipients as well as their incentives to participate in the traditional model of household specialization. Using the U.S. Time Use Survey and exploiting a series of recent reforms in several U.S. states that reduced the rights of eligible spouses, we find that wives surprised by the reforms reacted by increasing their labor supply, but the adjustment mechanism varied by educational group. While college educated wives' labor supply increased at the expense of time spent on housework and childcare, wives with less than a college degree sacrificed personal care and leisure time. Effects for men are generally smaller and not statistically significant. We also find a reduction in the rate of new births following the reforms, with the effect being much more pronounced in the case of women with a university education, suggesting that part of the difference in time use may be attributable to differences in preferences and the cost of children by educational levels. Since children are a marital public good, our results imply a decrease in marriage‐specific investment. The estimated effects are robust to various sensitivity tests and are greater in couples with a high‐income differential and therefore more exposed to changes in alimony laws.

中文翻译：

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赡养费对已婚妇女劳动力供应和生育率的影响：来自州级改革的证据


通常认为，减少离婚后配偶赡养费的改革会降低赡养费接受者的讨价还价能力，以及他们参与传统家庭专业化模式的动力。使用美国时间使用调查并利用美国几个州最近实施的一系列减少合格配偶权利的改革，我们发现对改革感到惊讶的妻子通过增加劳动力供应来做出反应，但调整机制因教育群体而异。虽然受过大学教育的妻子的劳动力供应增加，但花在家务和育儿上的时间是牺牲的，而大学学历以下的妻子却牺牲了个人护理和闲暇时间。对男性的影响通常较小，且无统计学意义。我们还发现，改革后新生儿率有所下降，其效果在受过大学教育的女性中更为明显，这表明时间使用的差异部分可能是由于受教育程度的偏好和儿童成本的差异。由于孩子是婚姻公共产品，我们的结果表明，针对婚姻的投资会减少。估计的影响对各种敏感性测试是稳健的，并且在具有高收入差异的夫妇中更大，因此更容易受到赡养费法律变化的影响。