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The effect of ecological compensation on a coevolutionary common pool resource game
Applied Mathematics and Computation ( IF 3.5 ) Pub Date : 2024-11-22 , DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2024.129208
Liyan Gao, Qiuhui Pan, Mingfeng He

Ecological compensation plays an important role in the governance of renewable resource. When the resource stock is not higher than the compensation threshold, the defector of excessive effort pays compensation cost to restore resources. This paper establishes a coupled social ecosystem based on the ecological compensation mechanism by using evolutionary game theory. It is found that ecological compensation mechanism can promote cooperation, realize the sustainable utilization of resources, narrow the fitness gap between agents and facilitate higher payoff for the population. There exists an optimal compensation intensity that makes the system in an ideal state with the highest cooperation level, sustainable resources and maximum population fitness. Compensation intensity exceeding the optimal value has no additional influence on the system. The impact of compensation threshold on the system is jump like and there are two critical values of compensation threshold. As long as the compensation threshold exceeds the larger critical value, the system can reach the ideal state. These findings provide theoretical basis for the relevant institutions to better formulate ecological compensation policies.

中文翻译:


生态补偿对协同进化的公共池资源博弈的影响



生态补偿在可再生资源治理中发挥着重要作用。当资源存量不高于赔偿阈值时,过度劳累的叛逃者支付赔偿成本以恢复资源。本文利用进化博弈论,建立了基于生态补偿机制的耦合社会生态系统。研究发现,生态补偿机制可以促进合作,实现资源的可持续利用,缩小主体之间的适应度差距,促进人群获得更高的回报。存在一个最优补偿强度,使系统处于具有最高合作水平、可持续资源和最大人口适应性的理想状态。超过最佳值的补偿强度不会对系统产生其他影响。补偿阈值对系统的影响呈跳跃状,补偿阈值有两个临界值。只要补偿阈值超过较大的临界值,系统就可以达到理想状态。这些发现为相关机构更好地制定生态补偿政策提供了理论依据。
更新日期:2024-11-22
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