This paper analyzes the reputational effects of forced CEO turnovers on outside directors. We find that directors interlocked to a forced CEO turnover experience large and persistent increases in withheld votes at subsequent re-elections relative to non-turnover-interlocked directors. Directors are not penalized for an involvement in a turnover per se but for forced CEO turnovers that are related to governance failures by the board. Our results challenge the widespread view that forcing out a CEO can generally be understood as a sign of a well-functioning corporate governance.

中文翻译：

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CEO 更替和董事声誉


本文分析了 CEO 强制更替对外部董事的声誉影响。我们发现，与非人员更替相关的董事相比，与强制 CEO 更替相关的董事在随后的重新选举中经历了大量且持续的弃权增加。董事不会因为涉及人员流动本身而受到惩罚，而是因为与董事会治理失败有关的 CEO 被迫更替。我们的结果挑战了普遍的观点，即迫使 CEO 下台通常可以被理解为公司治理运作良好的标志。