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Signals and stigmas from banking interventions: Lessons from the Bank Holiday of 1933
Journal of Financial Economics ( IF 10.4 ) Pub Date : 2024-11-22 , DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103968
Matthew Jaremski, Gary Richardson, Angela Vossmeyer

A nationwide panic forced President Roosevelt to declare a banking holiday in March 1933. The government reopened banks sequentially using a process that sent noisy signals about banks’ health. New microdata reveals that the public responded to these signals. Deposits at rapidly reopened banks rebounded quicker than at comparable or stronger banks that reopened even a few days later. The stigma of late reopening shifted funds from stigmatized to lauded banks and among communities that they served. Despite persisting over a decade, the shift had no measurable impact on the rate at which localities recovered from the Great Depression.

中文翻译:


银行干预的信号和耻辱:1933 年银行假日的教训



全国性的恐慌迫使罗斯福总统于 1933 年 3 月宣布银行假期。政府按顺序重新开放银行,使用一个发出有关银行健康状况的嘈杂信号的流程。新的微观数据显示,公众对这些信号做出了反应。快速重新开放的银行的存款反弹速度比几天后重新开放的同类或实力较强的银行更快。最近重新开放的耻辱使资金从被污名化的银行转移到备受赞誉的银行以及它们所服务的社区中。尽管持续了十多年,但这种转变对地方从大萧条中恢复的速度没有可衡量的影响。
更新日期:2024-11-22
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