The increasing prevalence of chronic diseases necessitates efficient and accessible healthcare delivery models, making telehealth platforms a promising solution. Telehealth has significantly improved chronic patients’ health by providing convenient, accessible, and personalized care, ultimately reducing hospital readmissions and improving patient outcomes. This research investigates the strategic collaboration between a physical hospital and an internet enterprise in developing a telehealth platform for chronic disease patients’ follow-up visits. We examine how government reimbursement policies and revenue-sharing contracts affect this collaborative model’s optimal pricing and performance. Using a four-stage sequential game theory model, we analyze two specific revenue-sharing contracts: capacity-based and volume-based. The study considers both homogeneous and differentiated reimbursement mechanisms, examining their influence on hospital profits, social welfare, and patient choice. Our findings demonstrate that volume-based contracts facilitate mutually beneficial collaborations, while capacity-based contracts favor hospital profitability. Homogeneous reimbursement has a limited feasible range and results in lower hospital profits and moderate social welfare. Differentiated reimbursement, coupled with the volume-based contract, maximizes social welfare by providing increased reimbursement for online patients and mitigating perceived value differences. This highlights the need for governments to prioritize differentiated reimbursement and volume-based contracts for robust and socially beneficial telehealth platforms. However, enhancing patient trust in the telehealth platform’s medical quality remains crucial for healthcare supply chain development under homogeneous reimbursement.

中文翻译：

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协调远程医疗平台与不同报销机制下的收入分享合同


慢性病患病率的日益增加需要高效且可访问的医疗保健服务模式，这使得远程医疗平台成为一种有前途的解决方案。远程医疗通过提供方便、可及和个性化的护理，显著改善了慢性病患者的健康状况，最终减少了再入院率并改善了患者的预后。本研究调查了实体医院和互联网企业之间的战略合作，为慢性病患者的随访开发远程医疗平台。我们研究了政府报销政策和收入分享合同如何影响这种协作模式的最佳定价和绩效。使用四阶段顺序博弈论模型，我们分析了两种特定的收入分享合同：基于容量和基于数量。该研究考虑了同质和差异化的报销机制，考察了它们对医院利润、社会福利和患者选择的影响。我们的研究结果表明，基于容量的合同促进了互惠互利的合作，而基于容量的合同有利于医院的盈利能力。同质报销的可行范围有限，导致医院利润较低，社会福利适中。差异化报销，加上基于数量的合同，通过为在线患者提供更高的报销和减少感知价值差异，实现社会福利最大化。这凸显了政府需要优先考虑差异化报销和基于数量的合同，以实现强大且对社会有益的远程医疗平台。 然而，在同质报销下，增强患者对远程医疗平台医疗质量的信任对于医疗保健供应链的发展仍然至关重要。