When adopting a dual-channel strategy, a supplier who initially provides the goods for an e-commerce platform’s reselling scheme typically has two direct-sale options: (i) retail channel encroachment by opening an independent store or (ii) commission channel encroachment through selling on the platform’s online marketplace. The supplier receives all retail revenue in the former but incurs a channel entry cost. In the latter, the supplier pays the platform commission based on the resulting sales revenue, and the platform may share its demand information with the supplier. We consider two quantity leadership structures: supplier-led and platform-led. First, we show that the platform employs a linear quantity decision rule in equilibrium when there is information asymmetry. Second, a quantity-leader platform always shares its information with the supplier via the commission channel, whereas a quantity-follower platform may not have any incentive to do so. Third, regardless of who the quantity leader is, the supplier always encroaches via the commission channel if the retail-channel entry cost is high and encroaches via the retail channel if that cost is low. Quantity leadership significantly impacts the supplier’s encroachment channel selection only when the retail-channel entry cost is moderate. In this situation, a quantity-leader supplier prefers retail (commission) encroachment, whereas a quantity-follower supplier prefers commission (retail) encroachment when the commission rate is low (high). Last, we consider an extended model that focuses on the simultaneous quantity competition game, and our results characterize the conditions where the supplier is less likely to choose the commission channel in a simultaneous game than in a sequential game.

中文翻译：

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供应商和平台主导的供应商侵占游戏


在采用双渠道策略时，最初为电子商务平台的转售计划提供商品的供应商通常有两种直销选择：（i） 通过开设独立商店来侵占零售渠道，或 （ii） 通过在平台的在线市场上销售来委托渠道侵占。供应商获得前者的所有零售收入，但会产生渠道进入成本。在后者中，供应商根据产生的销售收入向平台支付佣金，平台可能会与供应商共享其需求信息。我们考虑两种数量领导结构：供应商主导和平台主导。首先，我们表明，当存在信息不对称时，该平台在均衡中采用线性数量决策规则。其次，数量领先平台总是通过佣金渠道与供应商分享其信息，而数量跟随平台可能没有任何动力这样做。第三，无论数量领导者是谁，如果零售渠道进入成本高，供应商总是通过佣金渠道侵占，如果成本低，供应商总是通过零售渠道侵占。只有当零售渠道进入成本适中时，数量领先才会显著影响供应商的侵占渠道选择。在这种情况下，当佣金率较低（高）时，数量领先的供应商更喜欢零售（佣金）侵占，而数量跟随供应商更喜欢佣金（零售）侵占。最后，我们考虑一个专注于同步数量竞争博弈的扩展模型，我们的结果描述了供应商在同步博弈中比在顺序博弈中不太可能选择佣金渠道的情况。