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The bayesian and the abductivist
Noûs ( IF 1.8 ) Pub Date : 2024-11-21 , DOI: 10.1111/nous.12539
Mattias Skipper, Olav Benjamin Vassend

A major open question in the borderlands between epistemology and philosophy of science concerns whether Bayesian updating and abductive inference are compatible. Some philosophers—most influentially Bas van Fraassen—have argued that they are not. Others have disagreed, arguing that abduction, properly understood, is indeed compatible with Bayesianism. Here we present two formal results that allow us to tackle this question from a new angle. We start by formulating what we take to be a minimal version of the claim that abduction is a rational pattern of reasoning. We then show that this minimal abductivist principle, when combined with Bayesian updating by conditionalization, places surprisingly strong and controversial constraints on how we must measure explanatory power. The lesson is not that Bayesianism is definitely incompatible with abduction, but that both compatibilism and incompatibilism have hitherto unrecognized consequences. We end the paper by formulating these consequences in the form of a trilemma.

中文翻译:


贝叶斯主义者和诱拐主义者



在认识论和科学哲学之间的边界地带,一个主要的悬而未决的问题是贝叶斯更新和归纳推理是否兼容。一些哲学家——最有影响力的巴斯·范·弗拉森(Bas van Fraassen)——认为他们不是。其他人则不同意,认为正确理解绑架确实与贝叶斯主义兼容。在这里,我们提出了两个正式的结果,使我们能够从一个新的角度来解决这个问题。我们首先制定我们认为是绑架是一种理性推理模式这一主张的最小版本。然后,我们表明,当这种最小引伸主义原则与通过条件化的贝叶斯更新相结合时,对我们必须如何测量解释力施加了令人惊讶的强烈和有争议的约束。教训不在于贝叶斯主义绝对与绑架不相容,而是相容论和不相容论都有迄今为止未被认识到的后果。我们以三难困境的形式表述这些后果来结束本文。
更新日期:2024-11-21
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