There is ample evidence that the political exclusion of minorities from state power increases the risk of conflict. Nevertheless, do these same results apply to local representation? I explore this question using the success in mayoral elections of the Chilean Mapuche, a deprived indigenous minority in a longstanding conflict against the Chilean state. Combining a novel database on conflict and a surname strategy to single out Mapuche mayors, panel evidence suggests a negative association between minority mayors and local self-determination conflict. To provide identification, I exploit an electoral reform that exogenously changes the candidates’ probability of being elected. Land invasions, a primary type of conflict strategy for ethnic minorities, significantly decreased after the election of Mapuche mayors. I discuss the role of local horizontal inequalities and coercion as possible mechanisms.

中文翻译：

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地方代表会减少自决冲突吗？


有充分的证据表明，将少数群体政治排斥在国家权力之外会增加冲突的风险。然而，这些相同的结果是否适用于地方代表？我以智利马普切人在市长选举中的成功来探讨这个问题，马普切人是与智利国家的长期冲突中被剥夺的土著少数民族。小组证据将新颖的冲突数据库和姓氏策略相结合，以挑选出马普切市长，表明少数族裔市长与地方自决冲突之间存在负相关。为了提供身份识别，我利用了一项选举改革，它从外生方式改变了候选人当选的可能性。土地入侵是少数民族的一种主要冲突策略，在马普切市长选举后显着减少。我讨论了局部水平不等式和强制作为可能机制的作用。