Under what conditions do sponsors directly intervene in the target state’s civil conflicts? While previous research on state sponsorship for the rebels tends to focus on how ties between the two can influence their interactions, this article argues that the sponsor is more willing to provide combat support when the target state is under the rule of a personalist regime. Due to a lack of internal constraints, personalist leaders are more likely to pursue aggressive foreign policies. The high degree of policy flexibility also makes personalist regimes unreliable partners for negotiation. To avoid future instability, rival states are more likely to use civil conflicts as opportunities to weaken the personalist regime. Military ineffectiveness under personalist regimes also lowers the cost of combat support and potentially allows sponsors to reap more material benefits from the civil conflict. Utilizing comprehensive data on personalism and rebel sponsorship, I find support for this argument.

中文翻译：

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个人主义政权和内战中的叛军支持


担保人在什么情况下直接干预目标国家的内战？虽然之前关于国家对叛军的支持的研究往往集中在两者之间的联系如何影响他们的互动，但本文认为，当目标国家处于个人主义政权的统治下时，赞助商更愿意提供战斗支持。由于缺乏内部约束，个人主义领导人更有可能追求激进的外交政策。高度的政策灵活性也使个人主义政权成为不可靠的谈判伙伴。为了避免未来的不稳定，敌对国家更有可能利用内战作为削弱个人主义政权的机会。个人主义政权下的军事无效性也降低了战斗支持的成本，并可能使赞助者从内战中获得更多物质利益。利用关于个人主义和反叛赞助的全面数据，我找到了对这一论点的支持。