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Debunking Three Myths About Misinformation
Current Directions in Psychological Science ( IF 7.4 ) Pub Date : 2024-11-19 , DOI: 10.1177/09637214241280907 Bertram Gawronski, Lea S. Nahon, Nyx L. Ng
Current Directions in Psychological Science ( IF 7.4 ) Pub Date : 2024-11-19 , DOI: 10.1177/09637214241280907 Bertram Gawronski, Lea S. Nahon, Nyx L. Ng
Recent years have seen a surge in research on why people fall for misinformation and what can be done about it. Drawing on a framework that conceptualizes truth judgments of true and false information as a signal-detection problem, the current article identifies three inaccurate assumptions in the public and scientific discourse about misinformation: (1) People are bad at discerning true from false information, (2) partisan bias is not a driving force in judgments of misinformation, and (3) gullibility to false information is the main factor underlying inaccurate beliefs. Counter to these assumptions, we argue that (1) people are quite good at discerning true from false information, (2) partisan bias in responses to true and false information is pervasive and strong, and (3) skepticism against belief-incongruent true information is much more pronounced than gullibility to belief-congruent false information. These conclusions have significant implications for person-centered misinformation interventions to tackle inaccurate beliefs.
中文翻译:
揭穿关于错误信息的三个神话
近年来,关于人们为什么会陷入错误信息以及可以采取哪些措施的研究激增。本文借鉴了一个将真假信息的真相判断概念化为信号检测问题的框架,确定了公众和科学话语中关于错误信息的三个不准确假设:(1) 人们不善于辨别真假信息,(2) 党派偏见不是判断错误信息的驱动力,以及 (3) 容易受骗虚假信息是导致不准确信念的主要因素。与这些假设相反,我们认为 (1) 人们非常善于辨别真假信息,(2) 对真假信息的回应中存在普遍而强烈的党派偏见,以及 (3) 对信念不一致的真实信息的怀疑比对信念一致的虚假信息的轻信要明显得多。这些结论对以人为本的错误信息干预以解决不准确的信念具有重要意义。
更新日期:2024-11-19
中文翻译:
揭穿关于错误信息的三个神话
近年来,关于人们为什么会陷入错误信息以及可以采取哪些措施的研究激增。本文借鉴了一个将真假信息的真相判断概念化为信号检测问题的框架,确定了公众和科学话语中关于错误信息的三个不准确假设:(1) 人们不善于辨别真假信息,(2) 党派偏见不是判断错误信息的驱动力,以及 (3) 容易受骗虚假信息是导致不准确信念的主要因素。与这些假设相反,我们认为 (1) 人们非常善于辨别真假信息,(2) 对真假信息的回应中存在普遍而强烈的党派偏见,以及 (3) 对信念不一致的真实信息的怀疑比对信念一致的虚假信息的轻信要明显得多。这些结论对以人为本的错误信息干预以解决不准确的信念具有重要意义。