This study investigates the impact of debt maturity on the marginal value of cash holdings. It posits that short-term debt acts as a crucial governance mechanism by reducing agency conflicts and aligning managerial actions with shareholder interests. Using a sample of U.S. public firms, the results indicate that firms with higher proportions of short-term debt have a greater marginal value of cash, reflecting more efficient resource allocation and reduced managerial opportunism. The necessity for frequent capital market interactions associated with short-term debt mitigates agency conflicts. Additionally, the study explores three potential mechanisms: financial constraints, managerial moral hazard, and information asymmetry.

中文翻译：

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债务到期日和现金持有的边际价值


本研究调查了债务到期对现金持有边际价值的影响。它假设短期债务通过减少机构冲突并使管理行动与股东利益保持一致，起到关键治理机制的作用。使用美国上市公司样本，结果表明，短期债务比例较高的公司具有更大的现金边际价值，这反映了更有效的资源配置和更少的管理机会主义。与短期债务相关的频繁资本市场互动的必要性减轻了代理冲突。此外，该研究还探讨了三种潜在机制：财务约束、管理道德风险和信息不对称。