A new practice among online retail platforms, e.g., Amazon and Wayfair, is to offer their own private label product and a substitutable exclusive manufacturer product. We employ a game theoretic approach to examine conditions under which a retailer and a manufacturer find it optimal to enter into such a partnership. Our analysis reveals that a retailer finds it profitable to partner with a manufacturer with one of two profiles. The first is a manufacturer with low unit production and holding costs and large capacity, and the retailer gives the manufacturer most of the market share. In this case, the retailer uses a low private product price and marketing effort to pressure the manufacturer to set a low exclusive product price, which increases the manufacturer's revenue and the retailer's fees. The second is a manufacturer with a large consumer base, high unit production and holding costs, and small capacity. For this profile, the retailer takes most of the market share by offering a low private product price, and the manufacturer is unable to counteract the retailer's low private product price and marketing effort. The partnership results in a lower price when the marketing effort is costly and the retailer relies on private product price, intensifying price competition. Under some conditions, the retailer's profit may decrease in his share of the manufacturer's revenue. Also, the retailer may increase the marketing effort and decrease the private product price, not to take market share, but to pressure the manufacturer to decrease price.

中文翻译：

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电子商务中的零售商-制造商合作伙伴关系：双重产品战略和市场份额动态


在线零售平台（例如 Amazon 和 Wayfair）中的一种新做法是提供自己的自有品牌产品和可替代的独家制造商产品。我们采用博弈论方法来研究零售商和制造商认为建立这种伙伴关系的最佳条件。我们的分析表明，零售商发现与具有以下两种情况之一的制造商合作是有利可图的。第一种是单位生产和持有成本低、产能大的制造商，零售商将大部分市场份额交给制造商。在这种情况下，零售商使用较低的私人产品价格和营销努力向制造商施压，要求其设置较低的独家产品价格，从而增加制造商的收入和零售商的费用。第二种是消费者基础大、单位生产和持有成本高、产能小的制造商。对于此配置文件，零售商通过提供低廉的自有产品价格占据了大部分市场份额，而制造商无法抵消零售商较低的自有产品价格和营销努力。当营销工作成本高昂且零售商依赖私人产品价格时，这种合作伙伴关系会带来更低的价格，从而加剧价格竞争。在某些情况下，零售商的利润可能会减少他在制造商收入中所占的份额。此外，零售商可能会增加营销力度并降低私人产品价格，不是为了抢占市场份额，而是为了迫使制造商降低价格。