We adopt a difference-in-difference approach to investigate the relationship between the board network and the acquirer's cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) by examining the influence of the directors' sudden death or retirement. We find that firms experiencing the departure of well-connected directors tend to obtain higher CAR when acquiring private targets. This suggests that well-connected directors may reduce the values of mergers and acquisitions (M&A). However, acquirers with greater external monitoring can reduce this negative effect. We also find that these directors with prior acquisition experience are more likely to secure board positions. In summary, these results support the agency problem that well-connected directors tend to make more M&A deals for their private benefits.

中文翻译：

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人脉广的董事的阴暗面：来自私营公司收购的证据


我们采用双重差分法，通过考察董事突然去世或退休的影响，考察董事会网络与收购方累积异常收益 （CAR） 之间的关系。我们发现，经历人脉广泛的董事离职的公司在收购私人目标时往往会获得更高的 CAR。这表明人脉广泛的董事可能会降低并购 （M&A） 的价值。但是，具有更多外部监控的收单机构可以减少这种负面影响。我们还发现，这些具有收购经验的董事更有可能获得董事会职位。总之，这些结果支持了代理问题，即人脉广的董事倾向于为了他们的私人利益而进行更多的并购交易。