This study examines the internal logic and dynamic evolution of corporate carbon information disclosure decision making. Drawing on the game-theoretical relationship among enterprises, third-party carbon verification agencies, and local governments, we analyze the intrinsic mechanisms by which rewards, punishment, and media supervision influence corporate carbon information disclosure behavior. We further examine each participant's strategy selection process in the corporate carbon information disclosure decision making under different conditions and consider the impact of key factors on the process. The findings show that the best evolutionary stabilization strategy consists of true disclosure, compliance, and negative support. A stronger reward and punishment mechanism of carbon information disclosure helps achieve greater self-regulation and reduce false disclosure. Enterprises are increasingly choosing true disclosure as the probability of media exposure increases. Decision makers involved in the carbon information disclosure process are influenced by image loss, disclosure costs, and government regulatory costs.

中文翻译：

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考虑奖惩机制和新媒体环境的企业碳信息披露演变


本研究考察了企业碳信息披露决策的内在逻辑和动态演变。借鉴企业、第三方碳核查机构和地方政府之间的博弈论关系，本文分析了奖惩和媒体监督影响企业碳信息披露行为的内在机制。我们进一步研究了不同条件下企业碳信息披露决策中每个参与者的策略选择过程，并考虑了关键因素对该过程的影响。研究结果表明，最好的进化稳定策略包括真正的披露、合规和消极支持。加强碳信息披露的奖惩机制有助于实现更大的自我调节，减少虚假披露。随着媒体曝光的可能性增加，企业越来越多地选择真实披露。参与碳信息披露过程的决策者会受到图像损失、披露成本和政府监管成本的影响。