This paper explores the interplay between reputation mechanisms, pre-commitment strategies, and financial market regulation. Through a theoretical model, we analyze how repeated interactions between market participants, combined with regulatory oversight, can lead to improved compliance and market efficiency. The study demonstrates that reputation mechanisms serve as powerful self-regulatory tools, as negative reputational feedback exerts a stronger influence on market behavior than positive feedback, particularly when the cost of non-compliance is high. Additionally, we investigate the role of pre-commitment in promoting market cooperation and separating equilibria, where high-quality suppliers distinguish themselves from lower-quality competitors. However, in the absence of stringent regulatory enforcement, pre-commitments may be exploited by low-quality suppliers, leading to market inefficiencies. Our findings suggest that a reputation-based, tiered regulatory framework can optimize resource allocation and enhance the effectiveness of financial market regulation. The paper concludes with policy recommendations for integrating these mechanisms into current regulatory practices and outlines areas for future research.

中文翻译：

---

声誉、承诺和金融市场监管


本文探讨了声誉机制、预先承诺策略和金融市场监管之间的相互作用。通过理论模型，我们分析了市场参与者之间的反复互动，以及监管监督如何提高合规性和市场效率。该研究表明，声誉机制是强大的自我监管工具，因为负面声誉反馈比积极反馈对市场行为的影响更大，尤其是在不合规成本很高的情况下。此外，我们还研究了预先承诺在促进市场合作和分离均衡中的作用，在均衡中，高质量的供应商将自己与低质量的竞争对手区分开来。然而，在没有严格的监管执行的情况下，预先承诺可能会被低质量的供应商利用，从而导致市场效率低下。我们的研究结果表明，基于声誉的分层监管框架可以优化资源分配并提高金融市场监管的有效性。本文最后提出了将这些机制纳入当前监管实践的政策建议，并概述了未来研究的领域。