In practical rationality, if two reasons for alternative actions are tied, then either action is *permissible*. In epistemic rationality, we get the Epistemic Ties Datum: if the reasons for belief and disbelief are tied, then withholding judgment is *required*. I argue that this difference is explained by a difference in default biases. Practical rationality is biased toward permissibility. An action is permissible unless the specific features of the situation (e.g., the costs and benefits that apply) make it prohibited. In contrast, epistemic rationality is biased toward withholding judgment. Withholding judgment is required unless the specific features of the situation (e.g., the evidence) makes belief or disbelief permissible. This difference explains the Epistemic Ties Datum. When the reasons for belief and disbelief are equally weighty, they cancel each other out. But then the only remaining reason is the default reason, or default bias, to withhold judgment. Since it is the only remaining reason, it requires us to withhold judgment.

在实践理性中，如果替代行动的两个理由是并列的，那么任何一种行动都是*允许的*。在认识理性中，我们得到了认识纽带基准：如果相信和不相信的原因是并列的，那么拒绝判断是*必需的*。我认为，这种差异可以用默认偏差的差异来解释。实践理性偏向于允许性。除非情况的特定特征（例如，适用的成本和收益）禁止采取行动，否则允许采取行动。相比之下，认识理性偏向于不做判断。除非情况的具体特征（例如证据）允许相信或不相信，否则需要保留判断。这种差异解释了认识纽带基准面。当相信和不相信的原因同样重要时，它们就会相互抵消。但是，剩下的唯一原因是拒绝判断的默认原因或默认偏见。既然这是唯一剩下的原因，它就要求我们不去评判。